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INTRODUCTION 
Japan's past defence policy has basically been 
framed by the tension between the US-Japan Security Treaty 
and the pacifist Constitution of Japan. Article 9 of the 
Constitution stipulates that, 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace 
based on justice and order, the Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as a means 
of settling international disputes. In order 
to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as 
other war potential will never be maintained. 
The right of belligerency of the state will not 
be recognised. 
The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) has always 
regarded itself as the sentinel guarding the Constitution, 
ensurlng that the Constitution will not be revised by the 
party in power, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).l 
Even though the JSP, as the largest opposition party In 
Japan, has been unable to keep the LDP to a strict 
interpretation of Article 9 - the non-maintenance of 
military forces - the JSP, by playing an inhibitive role, 
has made it difficult for the LDP to go beyond the loose 
interpretation of Article 9 - the r~ght of defensive 
defence for Japan without the capability to project 
military power abroad. 
1. The JSP has not been in power at the national level 
except for a brief period as one component in a 
coalition government between 1947 and 1948. 
2 
Why study the JSP and Defence Policy in the 1980's? 
One reason why the JSP has been considered to be 
relatively insignificant as a factor in the formulation of 
Japan's defence policy and in the ongoing national debate 
on defence is because the JSP has been a perennial 
opposition party. Moreover, it has been suffering from 
long term electoral decline. The party is unlikely to 
hold power in the foreseeable future, at least in its own 
right. Thus, the argument goes, the JSP never had and 
never will have any important input to Japan's defence 
policy. 
The party's adherence to "unarmed neutrality" 1S 
based on a strict reading of Article 9. It has often 
been pointed out that such an interpretation is too 
"idealistic" and naive for any states to adopt. 
"Unarmed Neutrality" has also been criticised as 
a slogan rather than a policy. It has often been 
perceived as a notion with no concrete or feasible 
proposals as to how such a scheme could be put into 
effect. Moreover, unarmed neutrality has been seen as 
the object of an "intra-party game" and is designed for 
internal party consumption rather than for a feasible 
policy for the security of Japan. 
Given the consistently strong American pressure 
on Japan to increase its contribution to the alliance, 
"there is a tendency to overestimate the effect of US 
influence on Japanese policy and underestimate the 
3 
constraints arising from the domestic political process" 2 
The major variables within the domestic setting 
which have influenced the formulation of defence policy 
and the national debate on defence are: the factionalised 
LDP; the Japanese bureaucracy; the defence community; 
public opinion, the press and the opposition parties. 
Even though the JSP is but one variable amidst a host of 
others, it is still an important and complex variable, 
being influenced and also influencing some of the other 
variables in turn. 
Even if the JSP is to remain in permanent 
opposition, it can deny the LDP the Diet consensus it 
seeks on certain defence related issues. One example 
is provided by Prime Minister Nakasone's attempt to 
breach the 1% GNP ceiling on defence spending in 1985. 
The JSP scored a symbolic victory when Nakasone promised 
to adhere to the 1% GNP barrier for the time being in the 
face of the JSP's threat to boycott the Diet's Budget 
proceeding. If the LDP attempts to ram its policy 
through the Diet, the JSP can adopt obstructionist tactics 
causlng a rupture in the smooth running of parliamentary 
proceedings. A JSP boycott would undermine the LDP's 
Diet programme including other legislation on other 
important matters of government. 
2. Aurelia George, "The Domestic Politics of Japanese 
Defence Spending", Current Affairs Bulletin, May 
1986, p.7. 
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Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the JSP 
plays only a "negative" or restrictive role in the 
formulation of defence policy, the party has exercised its 
initiative in defence policy formulation through 
interpellations in the Diet. Takuya Kubo, the one-time 
Secretary General of the National Defence Council, pointed 
out that one important way whereby Japan's defence policy 
is determined and clarified is by the "items on which 
opposition parties present opinions during Diet 
deliberations with decisions reached through government 
administrative replies to the oPposition".3 Kubo further 
elaborated, 
There are a considerable number of defence 
policy measures which have been adopted through 
the government's replies to opposition party 
questions and opinions during the course of Diet 
deliberations; for example, the limits of war 
potential and self-defence strength in relation 
to Article 9 of the Constitution, prohibition of 
conscription and dispatch of forces overseas, 
the three non-nuclear principles, whether or 
not possession of nuclear submarines is 
possible, the scope of the "Far East" referred 
to in Article 6 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, 
the substance of prior consultation in relation 
to that same treaty, the three principles on the 
export of weaponry, removal of the bombing 
equipment and mid-air refuelling capability of 
the F-4 fighter aircraft, etc. 4 
3. Takuya Kubo, "Japanese Defence Policy: Decision-
Making Process and Background", June 1978, p.4. (The 
source of this article is not known. The article is 
kept at the library of the Australia-Japan Centre, 
Australian National University.) 
4. ibid. 
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By asking leading questions, trying to pin the 
LDP down to specific defence issues, and attempting to 
force the LDP to clarify and to make a commitment to a 
particular position on defence, the JSP is actually making 
an indirect contribution to the formulation of Japan's 
defence policy. 
The JSP's unarmed neutrality policy has often 
been dismissed for being "unrealistic". It has, however, 
often been misunderstood. The current dominant Vlew 
within the JSP considers that unarmed neutrality lS 
achievable only at the end of a long, indeterminable 
process. Moreover, the JSP affirms that it is not so 
impractical to abrogate the Security Treaty or to disband 
the Self Defence Forces (SDF) immediately upon obtaining 
power through a coalition government. 
Interviews with the Chairman of the party, 
Mas~i Ishibashi, and various key factional leaders within 
the JSP, revealed that the dominant, though not unanimous, 
Vlew lS that when the socialists come into power, Japan 
will at the first stage remain temporarily within the 
alliance. During the second stage, Japan will leave the 
alliance and go through a process of Armed Neutrality. 
At this stage of armed neutrality, the JSP will attempt to 
decrease its armaments. The ideal goal of unarmed 
neutrality at the final stage will be attempted only if 
international and domestic conditions are favourable. 
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Thus, the operational policy of the JSP is to 
remaln temporarily within the Security Treaty arrangement 
and then at some later stage, adopt the position of armed 
neutrality for Japan. It is hoped that it will be armed 
neutrality with only limited military capability. The 
declaratory policy is that unarmed neutrality will be 
sought at the final stage of the process. Since the 
conditions for unarmed neutrality are extremely difficult 
to fulfill, what the JSP's defence thinking amounts to is 
actually armed neutrality for Japan. 
Why has the JSP not made explicit their real 
intentions of armed neutrality for Japan? This question 
will be dealt with in this thesis. 
It is true that unarmed neutrality has been used 
as a slogan for election purposes. In addition, the JSP 
has sought to contrast itself from the LDP, to attack the 
LDP for "militaristic" tendencies in mass mobilisation 
protests against the presence of American military bases 
in Japan, and to instil a sense of ideological purpose and 
commitment among the party's rank and file. Yet it 
cannot be said that the JSP lacks a defence policy. For, 
at another level, the JSP has well elaborated views on 
five interlocking sets of issues. 5 They are: 
5. To make the analysis of defence policy more 
manageable, the focus will be on these five inter-
related areas. This framework will subsequently 
also be applied to the individual JSP factions' 
defence policies. The last four categories have 
been adopted from Mike Mochizuki, "Japan's Search 
/I. 
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(1) The party's official world view and conception of 
international relations; 
(2) The question of threat to Japan; 
(3) The desirability of the US-Japan Alliance and its 
alternatives; 
(4) The constitutional, legal and treaty framework of 
defence policy; 
(5) The appropriate military force and posture. 
Since unarmed neutrality is the hallmark of the 
party, the JSP has always maintained a special interest In 
defence policy. The JSP also maintains a Defence and 
Foreign Affairs Committee within its Policy Board. 6 The 
JSP has oftentimes set up special project teams to study 
defence issues and also to re-evaluate its own defence 
policies. 
Why study the 1980's in relation to JSP's Defence Policy? 
The 1980's is an interesting period to study 
because the JSP has come under increasing pressure from 
the factions on the right wing of the party, the 
for Strategy: The Security Police Debate in the 
1980's" USJP Occasional Paper: 82-9, The Program on 
US-Japan Relations, Centre for International Affairs, 
Havard. Dec., 1982. 
6. An explanation of the role of the JSP's Foreign 
Affairs and Defence Committee is in Japan Socialist 
Review, No. 273, April 15, 1973. 
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Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Komeito, the 
JSP's potential coalition parties; and from the trade 
unions supportive of the JSP to shift towards more 
"realistic" policies. 
Internationally, the JSP's hope for the 
evolution of a peaceful environment, a crucial condition 
for the pursuit of unarmed neutrality, was further shaken 
by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. This 
event contributed to the demise of detente between the 
superpowers. The steady Soviet military buildup in North 
East Asia has lent credence to the view, for many 
Japanese, that there is a potential Soviet threat to 
Japan. The US has continued to apply pressure on Japan 
to increase its contributions to the alliance and for 
greater joint collaboration within the US global strategic 
framework. 
Domestically, the LDP has been testing the 
constraints on Japan's defence posture. 7 The DSP and 
7. The 1954 Self Defence Force Law outlaws 
conscription, prevents the SDF from undertaking 
military operations overseas and restricts the 
__ Japanese air, naval~ q-D<J-Bround forces to defensive 
operations, and then only in the event of an attack 
on the nation. The legally non-binding Principles 
that have been established by policy decision include: 
Japan's Three Principles on Armed Export (1967); the 
Government Policy Guideline on Arms Export (1976); 
the Three Non-N-uclear Principles (1967) banning the 
production, possession and the introduction into 
Japan of nuclear weapons; and the 1% GNP ceiling on 
annual military spending (1976). For a summary of 
the various constraints, see Aurelia George, op.cit, 
p.4. 
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Komeito have continued to shift closer to the LDP's 
position on defence. Public opinion has increasingly 
grown to accept the Security Treaty and the SDF. 8 
It is in this difficult milieu that the JSP's 
defence policy and its changes or inability to change is 
studied. 
The Key Concerns of the Thesis 
The focus of this study is how factional 
politics within the JSP, the quest for a coalition 
government with other parties, and the symbiotic relation-
ship with Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions) have had 
an impact on the JSP's defence policy. It will analyse 
the extent to which the JSP's defence policy has changed 
over the years. 
In 1983, the JSP, in order to revamp its 
moribund image, adopted the slogan of a "New JSP". In 
1985, at the December Party Convention, an attempt was 
made to drop the party's Marxist baggage and to adopt the 
8. Nevertheless, 30% of Japanese public opinion still 
prefers the policy of unarmed nuetrality for Japan at 
the turn of the decade. See Asahi, March 25, 1981. 
Moreover, Ishibashi's book On Unarmed Neutrality 
published in 1980, has become a bestseller in Japan. 
Even though not everyone who buys his book will 
necessarily subscribe to his reasoning, it still 
indicates a substantial interest in unarmed 
neutrality as a defence option for Japanc The 
English edition was titled Unarmed Neutrality: A Path 
to World Peace. (Organ newspaper Bureau, Socialist 
Party of Japan, Tokyo, 1985.) The author told me 
that 300,000 copies of his book had already been 
sold. " 
"New Declaration", an ideological platform which 
subscribes to social democracy. Have these moves made 
any impact on the JSP's defence policy? Has the JSP's 
defence policy in the 1980's been different from its 
policy of the past? In short, how and when did changes 
occur In its defence policy and what is the significance 
of these changes? This study will attempt to answer 
10 
these questions and will conclude by canvassing the 
problems and prospects of the JSP's operational policy of 
armed neutrality and its declaratory policy of unarmed 
neutrality. 
III 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND: THE JSP AND DEFENCE POLICY (1949-80) 
This chapter will examine landmarks in the 
JSP's defence policy between 1949 and 1980. It will 
examine the changes, the failed attempts to change, the 
compromlses and the consequences of not compromising on 
the party's defence policy. 
The important landmarks are: 
(i) Party Schisms of 1951 and 1959; 
(ii) Proposed Ishibashi Plan of 1966; 
(iii) Adoption of the Ishibashi Plan in 1969; 
(iv) The New Current group and its proposed policy of 
Armed Neutrality in 1976. 
Party Schisms and Defence 1951 and 1959 
Defence policy has always been a contentious and 
a divisive issue for the JSP. It has threatened, on two 
occaslons, the very stability of the party. This has 
been the result of ideological incompatibilities between 
the left and right factions of the JSp.l 
-- .. - .~ - -
In brief, the marxist-oriented Suzuki faction 
perceiv~d interQatto~al _ relations as a -contradiction 
1. The account of the JSP and defence policy in the 
early post war years relies heavily on J.A.A. 
Stockwin, The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism 
(Melbourne University Press, Melbourne: 1968). 
Another useful account is Allan B. Cole, George O. 
Totten, Cecil H. Uyehara, Socialist Parties in 
PostWar Japan (Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London: 1966). 
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between capitalism and socialism. 2 It distrusted the 
US as the archetypal capitalist state and conversely did 
not see socialist Russia as a threat. The capitalist 
states were seen to be warmongers while the socialist 
states, by definition, were peace-loving. Thus, they did 
not see any need for the Security Treaty because the USSR 
was not seen to be a threat to Japan. Such a treaty, 
they feared, could drag Japan into a war of the US's 
making. The alliance would also push Japan into 
rearmament with such a course serving US interests rather 
than the interests of Japan. Rearmament was also seen to 
be provocative and upsetting not only to Japan's immediate 
neighbours but also to the other Asian countries that had 
fallen under the yoke of Japanese militarism during the 
Second World War. Rearmament would be economically 
wasteful and could be politically and socially 
destabilising given the pre-war propensity of military 
interference in politics. The Suzuki faction sought a 
strict observation of Article 9 of the Constitution. It 
felt that unarmed neutrality was consistent with both the 
spirit and the letter of the Constitution. Hence, 
unarmed neutrality was considered to be the most 
appropriate pqlicy for the JSP and Japan. To fulfill 
2. The lineage of the Suzuki faction can be traced back 
to the pre-war Labour-Farmer faction (Ronoha) which 
in the late 1920's began propagating a one stage 
revolutionary strategy for Japan. Cole, Totten and 
Uyehara, ibid., pp.6-7, pp.278-279 and Stockwin, 
ibid., pp.20-23. 
~ 
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this, Japan should immediately both revoke the Security 
Treaty and disband the SDF. 
In contrast, the right wing Nishio faction 
subscribed to democratic socialism. 3 It perceived 
international relations as a struggle between democracy 
and communism. Its members were sympathetic towards the 
West; they feared communist Russia. While they had 
reservations about the unequal aspects of the Security 
Treaty, the Nishio faction nevertheless saw the utility of 
the alliance as a deterrence against the USSR. The 
Nishio faction subsequently even contemplated the 
amendment of Article 9 of the Constitution in order to 
legitimise the right of self defence by military means. 
Thus, they did not believe in unarmed neutrality. 
The Party Congress of January 1951 was 
preoccupied with the question of rearmament. The Nishio 
faction advocated the right of self-defence within the 
western camp against the perceived communist threat. The 
Suzuki faction countered with a resolution that endorsed 
the "three peace principles": a peace treaty with all the 
belligerent powers; permanent neutrality; no foreign 
military bases in Japan. A fourth "peace principle" -
"opposition to rearmament" - was added by the left. 
3 . The lineage of the Nishio faction can be traced back 
to the more conservative Social Democratic Party 
which was formed in 1926. This group known as the 
Socio-democratic Clique (Shamin-kei) advocated 
reforms rather than revolution. Cole, Totten and 
Uyehara, ibid., pp.6-7, 295. 
.., 
~ 
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Thus, unarmed neutrality was affirmed as the official 
party policy as the Suzuki faction succeeded in obtaining 
a majority support at the Party congress. 4 The 
opposition of the Nishio faction to unarmed neutrality was 
to no avail as the factional balance of power had shifted 
against them since 1949. 
The JSP was split asunder in October 1951 when 
the party could not agree on the stance to be taken 
towards the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Mutual 
Security Treaty signed with the US in September 1951. At 
opposite ends of the spectrum within the party, the Nishio 
faction supported the two treaties while the Suzuki 
faction opposed them. It took four years before a 
remarriage of convenience was effected. Security issues, 
once again, proved to be the most intractable problem for 
the reunlon. 
The "Locarno" concept of 1925, whereby the 
frontiers of France and Belgium were guaranteed by 
Germany, Belgium, France, Britain and Italy, became the 
basis for the eventual reunification of the left and right 
, I' t 5 SOCla lS s. It was hoped that non-aggression treaties 
between Japan, the USSR, China and the US could be signed 
4. This was partly a reaction against the right wing of 
the JSP which had participated in the unstable 
Katayama and Ashida coalition governments. The JSP 
suffered its worst ever defeat at the polls as the 
party was considered to be inept by the electorate. 
Stockwin, OPe cit., p.35. 
5. ibid., p. 71. 
1 , 
Ij 
II!I 
: ~ 
I~ 
Ii 
I iii! 
I" 
I!l 
'I 
'I 
, 
\, 
15 
so that neutrality for Japan would be tenable. 
Two aspects of the Security Treaty were shrouded 
ln ambiguity so that both sides could interpret them to 
h . . f . 6 t elr own satls actlon. Firstly, the time frame for the 
abolition of the Security Treaty was not mentioned. The 
left could emphasise the abolition of the Security Treaty 
while the right could make this dependent on the prior 
establishment of the four power non-aggression treaty. 
Another ambiguity was whether the Treaty should 
be revised or abolished. The right wanted a revision and 
to retain it while the left wanted to abolish it. The 
compromise solution was to juxtapose the two contradictory 
terms "revise" and "abolish" together in order to read: 
The JSP would "revise-abolish" the Security Treaty! 
As for the SDF, the left made a tactical 
concession by not insisting, as they had previously, on an 
immediate demobilisation of the SDF. It was agreed that 
any reduction in the SDF would have to be done gradually. 
To be logically consistent, either option (to do away with 
the Security Treaty before or after the establishment of a 
fLocarno-type system in North East Asia) would mean that 
Japan would have to go through a process of armed 
neutrality, since-the SDF was not to be abolished 
immediately. 
If armed neutrality could be deduced from the 
party's official defence policy of 1955, why was it not 
6 • ibid., pp.75-78. 
~ 
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mentioned? Could it be that the JSP's policy was 
logically inconsistent? One crucial reason why the JSP 
could not be explicit about armed neutrality was because 
the left factions would be vehemently against the policy 
of armed neutrality even if it was part of a process 
towards the ideal of unarmed neutrality. The pacifist 
sentiments of the Japanese people were very strong and it 
would be electorally disadvantagous to advocate such a 
position especially if armed neutrality could be perceived 
as leading Japan into increased rearmament. It would be 
confusing to the party's rank and file and party 
supporters. A position of armed neutrality would also be 
unacceptable to the JSP's key supporter, Sohyo, which has 
advocated "unarmed neutrality" for Japan. The party 
might be open to attacks from LDP members who supported 
the Security Treaty claiming that armed neutrality would 
be costlier - economically, politically and strategi cally 
- than the Security Treaty arrangement with the US. On 
the other hand, the JSP might unwittingly aid those LDP 
members who desired Japan to be strongly armed and neutral 
in the future rather than to be tied to the US security 
system. An open adoption of armed neutrality by the JSP 
could possibly weaken the party's ability to check the 
LDP's attempts at rearmament. The JSP's moral and 
constitutional arguments against the alleged 
"militaristic" tendencies of the LDP would also be weaker, 
for "armed neutrality" would contradict the JSP' s strict 
III 
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interpretation of Article 9. An explicit adoption of 
armed neutrality could also undermine, in the long run, 
the pacifist domestic environment of Japan. If the JSP 
were to make clear its operational policy of armed 
neutrality, it could be criticized both within and outside 
the Party as an act of folly that would play into the hands 
of the LDP. 
The Party Schism of 1959 
Despite the compromises between the left and the 
right factions, the contradictions between them over 
defence policy could not really be repressed. The 
conflicting outlook towards the revision of the Security 
Treaty contributed to the breakaway of the Nishio faction 
from the JSP in October 1959, together with some members 
of the Kawakami faction, to form the Democratic Social i st 
Party (DSP). The Nishio faction was critical of the 
militant struggles of the polit i cal left against the US 
military presence. It felt that it was beneficial for 
Japan to possess a revised treaty as a "shield against 
communist power until relaxation of international 
tensions, effective collective security, or greater 
Japanese economic and military strength could develop".7 
The left, on the other hand, was prepared for extra-
parliamentary opposition - mass demonstrations - to oppose 
the revision of the Security Treaty. 
7 . Cole, Totten and Uyehara, Ope cit. , p.73. 
n , 
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The secession of 1959 and the formation of the 
DSP removed the previous need to compromise on defence for 
both the Suzuki and the Nishio factions. The Suzuki 
faction, now dominant within the JSP, could reintroduce 
their preference for an immediate abrogation of the 
Security Treaty and the SDF. Thus, the breakaway of the 
right removed a brake on the leftward bent of the JSP. 
The Ishibashi Plan of 1966 
In May 1966, Ishibashi Mas~i, then the head of 
the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Policy 
Board, made public a draft of the JSP's defence policy.8 
It was an attempt to formulate a credible and concrete 
defence policy as an alternative to the other political 
parties' defence policies that were being presented around 
about the same time. China's hydrogen bomb tests and t he 
approaching expiration of the Security Treaty in 1970 gave 
impetus to the various parties to reconsider the question 
of national defence. 
When the draft of the Ishibashi Plan was 
unveiled, it was seen by the Japanese press as both new 
and the most concrete JSP defence policy to date. 9 
However Ishibashi remarked that it was merely a systematic 
packaging of various policies that had been adopted 
8. Japan Socialist Review No. 109, May 1, 1966, pp.14-24. 
9. Sankei, May 13, 1966. 
~ 
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10 before by the party. It was probable that such a 
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denial was aimed at avoiding antagonising those factions 
that had committed themselves to defence positions that 
were dissimilar to Ishibashi's draft. Thus it was likely 
that Ishibashi downplayed his draft as merely presenting 
policies which had been agreed to by the Party in the past 
in order to gain acceptance from the factionalised party. 
What were Ishibashi's proposals? With regard 
to the SDF, Ishibashi insisted that a socialist government 
should not dismantle the armed forces immediately. 
Ishibashi set four conditions to be met before the SDF 
11 
could gradually be reduced. Firstly, he emphasised 
that the international environment had to be favourable to 
Japan's disarmament. His position was that a gradual 
dissolution of the SDF would not be possible prior to the 
establishment of non-aggression pacts between Japan, USSR, 
China and the US; the reunification and the 
neutralisation of Vietnam and Korea; and the settlement 
of the Taiwan problem. 12 Secondly, the position of the 
JSP-Ied coalition government had to be stable. Thirdly, 
the JSP had to be able to establish its control over the 
SDF. Fourthly, the people's attitude towards the SDF 
would also be considered. Thus, given the difficulty of 
rOe 
11. 
12. 
Japan Socialist Review, No. 109, May 1, 1966, p.1S. 
ibid., pp.19-20. 
ibid., p.22. 
.., 
~ 
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fulfilling the above conditions, unarmed neutrality was, 
in effect, relegated to a distant ideal by the Ishibashi 
Plan. Ishibashi pointed out that the timing of the SDF's 
gradual dissolution should be flexible and not 
predetermined. As for the Security Treaty, Ishibashi 
proposed that non-aggression pacts with China and the USSR 
could be signed even during the term of the Security 
Treaty. Such a move, Ishibashi argued, would render the 
I~ Security Treaty redundant in substance. Since the 
premlse of the Security Treaty was that the two communist 
reglmes were potential threats to Japan, the multilateral 
non-aggresslon pacts would make the Security Treaty 
superfluous. 
How original were Ishibashi's proposals? The 
maln thrust of his proposals was that it was not possible 
immediately to do away with either the Security Treaty or 
the SDF. This policy was agreed to by the Suzuki fact i on 
as a tactical compromise with the Nishio faction when the 
party was reunified back in 1955. Ishibashi's stress on 
the importance of a peaceful international environment 
before Japan could begin its disarmament process was 
'" 
closer to the hitherto Nishio faction's official position 
than that of the Suzuki faction. What was new was the 
explicit way in which Ishibashi qualified the attainment 
r.~ 
of unarmed neutrality by articulating the four conditions 
and thus postponing it indefinitely. Yet Ishibashi 
differed from the Nishio position by not supporting the 
~ 
~ ~ 
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Security Treaty at all. Moreover Ishibashi, unlike 
Nishio, did not perceive any external threat to Japan and 
was against any tampering with the Constitution. 
Ishibashi was ambiguous about when a JSP 
government would give a one-year notice to the US to 
abrogate the Treaty. However, it could be argued that if 
the Security Treaty were as undesirable and dangerous as 
Ishibashi had claimed, the JSP should have sought its 
abrogation as soon as possible. Thus the abolition of 
the Security Treaty would be in the immediate agenda of a 
JSP led coalition government while there would be no 
timetable to achieve unarmed neutrality. The logical 
conclusion of the Ishibashi Plan was that a socialist 
government, upon leaving the alliance, would actually 
adopt a position of armed neutrality without a schedule to 
achieve the ideal of unarmed neutrality. 
The Ishibashi Plan came unstuck when it was 
swallowed up by factional politics. Ishibashi belonged 
to the Katsumata faction,13 which was then an anti-
mainstream faction. Any attempt to revise the defence 
policy supported by the mainstream Sasaki (ex Suzuki) 
faction would be regarded as a challenge, a criticism and 
an attempt to undermine the preferences and the leading 
13. Katsumata Seiichi was the heir of the Wada faction 
which was of post war origin. It had a left-leaning 
reputation but has occupied a centrist position in 
the JSP today. Ishibashi is the heir apparent of 
the Katsumata faction. 
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position of the Sasaki faction. This led the 
Asahi Shimbun to comment: IIThere have appeared increasing 
probabilities of the intra-party controversy over the 
security problem becoming serious, partly in connection 
with the main-current and anti-main current faction's 
strive for leadership, with the Party convention stated to 
be held in November ll • 14 
The controversy took on a main-stream and anti-
mainstream cleavage when the Eda faction, which was 
antipathetic towards the Sasaki faction, joined in the 
fray by supporting the Katsumata faction in reconsidering 
the party's defence policy.1S The Eda faction supported 
immediate abrogation of the Security Treaty and rejected 
the state of the international environment as a condition 
to be met before the SDF could be gradually reduced. 
Thus, the Eda faction's position differed from 
Ishibashi's position in that the external environment had to 
be considered before the SDF could be gradually dissolved. 
Nevertheless the Eda faction seized the opportunity to put 
down the Sasaki faction by commenting that the mainstream 
faction's defence policy was IIbackward ll • 16 Thus, defence 
policy had been conveniently used by the Eda faction as a 
factional weapon against its rival, the Sasaki faction. 
14. Asahi, May 12, 1966. 
15. Yomiuri, June 15, 1966. 
16. Tokyo Shimbun, Evening May 26, 1966. 
,., 
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The Sasaki faction condemned the Ishibashi Plan 
as glvlng the impression that the Security Treaty would 
be maintained even after the non-aggression treaties had 
1111 been signed under a JSP-Ied regime. This was 
unacceptable to the Sasaki faction which stressed the 
abrogation of the Security Treaty. Its hostility towards 
the Ishibashi Plan was also due to the fact that the plan 
was drafted by the Committee on Defence and Foreign 
Affairs which, at that time, was dominated by the anti-
, f t' 17 malnstream ac lons. 
The Sasaki's faction rejected the Ishibashi Plan 
"II tl," 
on the grounds that it would undermine the party's policy 
Ij of unarmed neutrality. It also rejected the inclus i on of 
11 the international situation as a criterion to be met 
before unarmed neutrality could be attempted. The 
faction insisted that "if a Socialist Party Government 
were to withhold retrenchment and reduction of war 
potential because of the trends of [sic] the international 
situation, and were to retain war potential as an 
endorsement for its security, it would mean in practice, 
ill! 
the upsetting of our party's position for unarmed 
peace" 18 As for the proposal that the Security Treaty 
liII!, 
could be temporarily retained even when non aggression 
I~ 
!( 
17. Tokyo Shimbun, June 6, 1966. 
11., 
18. Asahi, Evening, June 4, 1966. 
~ 
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pacts had been made, the Sasaki faction stated: "This 
argument is nonsense Is there not a contradiction ln 
adopting the two security frameworks? The Security 
Treaty would oblige Japan to be involved in a US initiated 
conflict with China and the USSR. Yet such an action 
could not be permiss t ble upon the signing of the non-
19 
aggresslon pacts". 
Another concern of the Sasaki faction was the 
danger of giving an impression that the JSP's defence 
policy was shifting towards the right. Such a trend 
would be to the LDP's advantage because the LDP would 
welcome a national consensus on defence. Toleration of 
the Security Treaty would also undermine the JSP's 
argument in favour of abrogating the Security Treaty ln 
1970. The anti-mainstream counter-argument was that the 
mainstream Sasaki faction was too doctrinaire and 
unrealistic. This had the effect of depriving the JSP of 
the ability to take the reins of power. 20 
Despite the intra-party acrimony over the 
party's defence policy, a compromise was reached between 
the opposing factions. The final draft of the defence 
policy stressed that "in order to secure peace, Japan must 
abrogate the Japan-US Security Treaty, let the United 
19. ibid. 
20. Tokyo Shimbun, June 6, 1966. 
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States withdraw its forces from Japan and stick firmly 
I , f " I' II 21 to a po lCY 0 posltlve neutra lty . The emphasis was 
on abrogating the treaty and no mention was made of 
keeping the treaty even when the Locarno-type system had 
been introduced. In this way, the Sasaki faction was 
placated. The abrogation of the Security Treaty, 
however, would be in accordance with IInormal diplomatic 
procedures II and a demand for an immediate, unilateral 
abrogation of the Security Treaty was not included in the 
final draft. Thus the Katsumata faction could derive 
partial satisfaction from the omission. Ishibashi also 
won agreement that the SDF would gradually be reduced, 
with proper consideration given to the stability of the 
JSP-led coalition government; control over the SDF; and 
the people's support for such a move. However, the 
condition that a favourable international environment 
should exist prior to the gradual dissolution of the SDF, 
which the Sasaki faction had vehemently opposed, was removed. 
As a result of these factional compromlses, no 
factions emerged as clear-cut winners or losers. Perhaps 
the only loser was the JSP, whose oscillating defence 
policy was shown to be mainly a consequence of factional 
considerations. Nevertheless, such a compromise was 
necessary to defuse the defence policy conflict amongst 
the factions which could have divided the JSP even 
further. 
21. Japan Socialist Review, No. 117, October 1966, p.14. 
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The Ishibashi Plan Resurrected 1969 
By 1968, both the Eda faction and the Katsumata 
faction had become mainstream factions. The change in 
the factional balance of power facilitated a 
reconsideration of the party's defence policy.22 The 
Sasaki faction at that time was experiencing internal 
problems, which eventually resulted in the breakaway by 
some leaders of the Sasaki faction. 23 It was possible 
that the Sasaki faction was distracted by its factional 
problems and so was in a weaker position to challenge the 
readoption of the Ishibashi Plan in March 1969. 
Moreover, Sohyo had applied pressure on the JSP 
to rejuvenate itself after the JSP's poor performance In 
the 1968 Upper House election. One of Sohyo's demands 
was for the JSP to consider the "need for concrete 
substance to the argument for non-armament neutrality".24 
Not surprisingly, the reconsideration of defence 
policy opened up differing views on the subject. Former 
Policy Deliberation Committee Chairman Isei Ide was 
reported as supporting an "armed neutrality type" 
option 25 . At the other end of the spectrum, the former 
22. The Sasaki faction suffered a setback when their foe, 
Eda Saburo, became the new Secretary General of the 
party. Upon gaining office, Eda signalled his 
intention to review the JSP's defence policy. See 
Tokyo Shimbun, October 5, 1968. 
23. Asahi, December 12, 1968. 
24. Tokyo Shimbun, July 21, 1968. 
25. Nihon Keizai, January 24, 1969. 
,.. 
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"e:nbe:=-s 0:: the de::u:1ct Peace Comrade Society and a part of 
the Sasaki faction formed a small militant group called 
.Ae "Comrades Societ\T for Crushing the Japan - US Security 
mreaty" January 1969 . 26 Despite the militants within 
e DartYr the ~shibashi Plan was finally revived. 
eve:=-theless r certain policies were adopted to appease the 
militants. The party policy asserted that 1n a 
hypothetical invasion of Japan, armed resistance would not 
be resorted to. Other arg~~ents within the party 1n 
favour 0= voluntary armed resistance by a militia and 
resistance by the national police force ( a euphemistic 
title ::or the S~F ) were rejected. 
_.Ae e:npnasls in the defence policy was on 
abrogaLing e Securi ~reaty : lithe first diplomatic 
step ( 0= a JS? government ) will be ( to ) give notice to the 
United SLates Government 0= Japan's intention to terminate 
the Japan- US Securi reaty and it will be eventually 
abolished through diplomatic negotiation ll • 2 7 
Since 1969 r the Ishibashi Plan has gained the 
status of the official policy of the JSP . Subsequent 
treatises officially released by the JSP on defence have 
been a restatement or elaboration of the Ishibishi Plan. 
In 1973. the overthrow of the democratically 
e lected Socialist Allende government in Chile had a 
1 , January 27. 19 
-----
7 • 1 arcn 2 1 
~ 
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salutory effect on Katsumata Seiichi, the then Chairman of 
the Socialist Theory Committee. He remarked: "(It) 
cannot be said that the SDF will not carry out a coup 
de'tat after the establishment of a people's coalition 
government in Japan".28 
His committee then recommended measures to 
reinforce civilian control of the SDF. Hence there was a 
growing awareness within the JSP that it would be 
difficult to dismantle a large, armed organisation. 
There was increasing acceptance within the party of the 
official Ishibashi line of a long-term, gradual 
dissolution of the SDF. Such a line, as argued earlier, 
amounted to the adoption of a policy of armed neutrality 
for Japan, given the JSP's rejection of the Security 
Treaty and the difficulties of disbanding the SDF. 
The New Current Group and Armed Neutrality : 1976 
In December 1975, three Diet members from the 
New Current Association,29 Hideo Den, Yanosuke Narazaki 
and Yutaka Hata, presented a draft defence policy to the 
28. Yomiuri, September 30, 1973. 
29. The New Current Association (Atarashi Nagare no Kai) 
was formed in 1973. It is inclined towards the 
right. It is favourably disposed towards the West 
and China. It stands in direct confrontation with 
the Socialist Association which is ultra left and 
pro USSRo 
29 
party and the general public. 30 It gave a very detailed 
breakdown of the equipment, personnel and expenses of the 
SDF at different stages of the process leading to a 
reduction, but not the negation, of the SDF. Their plan 
envisaged a three-stage process for the abrogation of the 
Security Treaty and the reduction of the SDF. The first 
stage would involve the measures adopted by a "provisional 
coalition government" (possibly including even elements 
from the LDP); at the second stage would be policies 
taken during the term of a "Middle of the Road Coalition 
Government" (JSP-Komeito-DSP coalition government); at 
the third stage would be policies conducted by a 
"Renovationist Unified Government" (JSP government). At 
the last stage, the SDF would be abolished. However a 
smaller People's Guard Corp would still be maintained 
equipped with tanks, artillery, missiles, fighter planes 
and naval crafts. As for the Security Treaty, the JSP 
would seek to limit its functions. It would insist on 
the strict observation of prior consultation; the scope 
of the Far East would be redefined more narrowly; US 
reconnalssances uSlng Japan as a base would be suspended; 
------- --
and the movements of US forces using bases in Japan would 
also be restricted. At the second stage, negotiations 
30. Yomiuri, December 21, 1975. See also the ten part 
series featured in Yomiuri (January 11, 1976 to 
January 20, 1976) where the three New Current Diet 
members debated three top Japan Defence Agency 
officials on defence policy. 
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would be carried out to replace the Security Treaty with a 
Friendship Treaty. At the third stage, the Security 
Treaty would be abolished. Even at the final stage, when 
Japan had left the alliance, an armed organisation, 
euphemistically labelled as the People's Guard Corps, would 
still be retained. As for diplomatic measures to 
facilitate the reduction of the SDF, bilateral peace 
treaties would be signed with China and the USSR. Given 
the Sino-Soviet conflict, a Locarno-type system would not 
be feasible. The New Current group also avoided any 
suggestion of a Locarno system to disassociate its idea 
from the Asian Collective Security System promoted by the 
USSR at that time. 
The New Current group presented their defence 
concept as a "development of the Ishibashi Plan of 
1966". 31 This could have been an attempt to camouflage 
their programme and make it acceptable to the party. 
While armed neutrality could be inferred from Ishibashi's 
position, the New Current group's defence policy was much 
more explicit about armed neutrality. Hideo Den 
commented: "There is a problem in the point that non-
militarization and neutrality are put together. 
Therefore, although neutrality would be attained, the time 
when a situation of non-militarization could be attained 
globally would be much later. In the case of Japan, too, 
31. Asahi, December 21, 1975. 
i" 
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it lS increasingly possible that it will be delayed. ,,32 
Yutaka Hata also pointed out that if Japan were to "go 
through the stages as mentioned in our tentative draft, 
there will be lightly-armed neutrality at a certain time 
,,33 (emphasis mine). 
The New Current group's proposal, just like the 
Ishibashi's proposals back in 1966, ran aground because of 
factional politics. At the time the proposal was 
floated, the New Current Association had forged an 
alignment with the Eda faction and the Sasaki faction to 
oppose the doctrinaire Marxist Socialist Association 
(Shakaishugi Kyokai) that was threatening to dominate the 
JSP 34 
. Since the New Current Association was part of the 
anti-Kyokai alignment, its defence proposals were not only 
disagreeable to the Socialist Association but also took 
the form of a provocative challenge to it. 
The Socialist Association rejected the New 
Current group's proposals on two counts: "the first point 
is that even at the final stage of the three stages, the 
presence of an armed group - armaments - is being 
recognised, under the name of the people's guard corps. 
32. Yomiuri, January 11, 1976. 
33. ibid. 
34. The Socialist Association was first set up as a 
theoretical group in 1950. By the mid 70's it had 
developed strong grassroots support even though its 
Diet representation was negligible. It became a 
threat to the established factions. The Socialist 
Association wanted the JSP to be turned into a class-
based, revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party. 
32 
Will this not run contrary to the JSP's principle for 
Unarmed Neutrality?,,35 Secondly, the Socialist 
Association rejected any notion that, at the first stage 
of the provisional coalition government, any alignment 
with LDP elements would be permissable. 
No criticisms from the Sasaki faction were 
reported by the press. This might seem surprising as the 
Sasaki faction had traditionally exhibited hostility to 
any suggestions of prolonging the existence of the 
Security Treaty and the SDF. It was plausible that it 
withheld criticisms of the New Current group as a result 
of its anti-Kyokai alignment with the New Current faction 
and its resentment towards the Socialist Association that 
had encroached on its hitherto dominant position in the 
JSP. Moreover, the Sasaki faction that had been 
staunchly pro-China, became more muted in its criticism of 
the Security Treaty and the SDF after China had adopted a 
positive attitude towards the US-Japan alliance as a 
counterbalance against the Soviet Union. 
Because the New Current group's defence 
proposals were caught up in factional politics within the 
JSP and given the powerful influence of the Socialist 
Association on the JSP at that time, its proposals simply 
floundered and were not adopted by the party. 
35. Sankei, January 19, 1976. 
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The confrontation between the anti-Kyokai and 
Kyokai forces in 1977 led first to the defection of Eda 
Saburo and then the defection of Hideo Den and a number of 
Socialist Dietmen in October. Eda, in forming the 
Socialist Citizen League, adopted a less idealistic 
outlook towards defence: "I do not abandon the idea of 
non-armament as the ideal of the nation. However, as to 
the reality, we cannot do that".36 Hideo Den also 
adopted a different policy upon leaving the JSP. He 
asserted that the Security Treaty and the SDF should be 
maintained while the "USSR is pursuing hegemonism 
actively".37 While not denying the ideal of leaving the 
US-Japan Alliance and changing the SDF into a land 
construction corps, Den felt that the "Soviet threat" 
would not permit Japan to leave "the alliance in the 
immediate future. The difference between Hideo Den's new 
official outlook and the defence policy that he had 
espoused earlier as a member of the New Current 
Association, was that he now publicly acknowledged the 
benefits of the alliance as a deterrence against potential 
threats. Prior to that, both Den and lshibashi, despite 
their differences, claimed that there was no threat to 
Japan. Hence, they did not view the Security Treaty as 
necessary or desirable for Japan. Their formulation of 
defence policies had less to do with potential foreign 
36. Sankei, November 4, 1977. 
37. Sankei, November 2, 1977. 
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threats to Japan than the obstacles to be met within Japan 
before the SDF could be gradually dissolved. 
The change in outlook by both Eda Saburo and 
Hideo Den suggested that both Eda and Den might not have 
subscribed to unarmed neutrality beyond giving lip-
service while they were in the JSP. It would have been 
difficult to articulate such views given the sensitivities 
and the probable resistance from rival factions within the 
party. 
The Official Ishibashi Line: The 1980's 
Ishibashi's treatise, On Unarmed Neutrality, 
first published in 1980 has been regarded as the official 
party policy since that time. However, at the factional 
level, there has been a diversity of views on defence. 
Some of the views of the various factions do not 
necessarily mirror the party's official defence policy. 
The differences between the factions extend to divergent 
world views; dissimilar emphasis on threats to Japan; 
attitudes towards the Security Treaty; disagreement over 
the legality of the SDF; whether passive resistance or 
armed resistance is to be adopted in a hypothetical 
invasion of Japan; and whether Japan would have to pass 
through a process of armed neutrality. The following 
chapter will analyse the individual faction's attitudes, 
responses and influence on JSP's defence policy amidst the 
changes both internal and external of the party in the 
1980's. 
CHAPTER TWO 
INTRA-PARTY DYNAMICS . . 
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FACTIONAL POLITICS AND DEFENCE 
In this chapter, the following questions will be 
considered: 
(i) What are the individual defence policies of the 
JSP factions in the 1980's? 
(ii) What is the nature of factionalism in relation 
to defence? 
The JSP factions and their defence policies in the 1980's 
The factions, ranging from right to left of the 
political spectrum, are: Seikoken, Shaken, Katsumata 
faction, New Birth Research Association and the Socialist 
Association. 
Seikoken (Seiken Koso kenkyukai [Political Power Concept 
Research Council]) 
Seikoken was formed in 1979 with the declared 
alm of promoting social democracy and establishing a JSP 
led government. It is an amalgamation of the New Current 
Association, the Tanabe group, the Kawakami group and the 
Hori group. 
In 1982, Asukata, supported by the left 
factions, picked Noburo Baba, a leader from the New Birth 
Association, as the party's Secretary General. Seikoken, 
supported by Sohyo, demonstrated its clout by forcing the 
36 
party to reshuffle its leadership.1 Baba lost his post 
while Asukata's reputation was irrevocably damaged. He 
was succeeded by Ishibashi in 1983. Makoto Tanabe from 
Seikoken subsequently became the Secretary General. 
Since 1983, the balance of power has shifted towards 
Seikoken. It has been consistently successful in 
increasing its share of the CEC posts. 2 Seikoken's 
influence is augmented by its alignment with Shaken and 
the Katsumata faction. It has benefited from the decline 
in the JSP left. 
Seikoken supports a coalition with the DSP and 
Komeito and even with segments of the LDP. Sanji Muto, a 
top Seikoken leader, believes that "if the elections 
result in creating a state of equality (between the 
strengths of the ruling party and the opposition parties 
in the Diet) we will probably be able to form a coalition 
with Toshio Komoto or Kiichi Miyazawa of the LDP".3 Both 
LDP leaders are acceptable to Muto possibly because they 
are less "hawkish" on defence. 
Seikoken's defence policy is influenced by the 
1. See Asahi, February 7, 1982; Nihon Keizai, March 16, 
1982; Nihon Keizai, December 9, 1982. 
2. The success in obtaining positions in the CEC is a 
good barometer of the rising fortunes of the right. 
See Tokyo Shimbun, Evening, December 15, 1982; 
Sankei, December 1982; Asahi, December 18, 1982; 
Mainichi, September 1, 1983; Sankei, February 20, 
1986; Mainichi, Evening, January 22, 1986. 
3. Asahi, July 29, 1984. 
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considerations of a possible coalition with the DSP and 
Komeito. To make the JSP an acceptable partner, it 
entails "realistic" changes to the JSP's defence pOlicy. 
Seikoken's dilemma is that if it tries to change the 
party's defence policy, it may further complicate the 
difficult tasks of promoting a "New JSP" and adoption of 
the New Declaration. The Socialist Association was 
extremely sensitive to the DSP's remark that the adoption 
of the New Declaration would lead to discarding the policy 
of unarmed neutrality.4 Such a move, the DSP claimed, 
would bring the JSP, at long last, more closely in line 
with the DSP's defence policy. 
Thus, one possible reason why Seikoken has kept 
a low profile on defence is to decouple the issue of 
defence from controversy over the New Declaration. If a 
link is formed by its opponents between the reviews of 
JSP's defence policy and the New Declaration, it will make 
the tasks of changing its defence policy and the 
affirmation of the New Declaration doubly hard. Given 
the controversial nature of defence issues, any premature 
moves to change the party's defence policy might be 
intertwlned -wi'tn the imme-diate task of adopting the New 
Declaration. If there had been a convergence of 
attempted changes to both defence and the New Declaration, 
4. See Santo Akira, 
('The influence of the Democratic Socialist 
2arty and the Danger of Abandoning Unarmed Neutrality'). 
Shakaushugi (Socialism), September 1985, No. 245, 
p.68. 
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it would have given the New Declaration's opponents the 
opportunity to rally those who supported unarmed 
neutrality and the New Declaration to reject the latter on 
the grounds that it would open the floodgates of change to 
party principles including unarmed neutrality. 
Even though Seikoken is the JSP's largest 
faction, it has encountered enormous difficulties even 1n 
attempting limited changes to the party's defence policy. 
Only if Seikoken continues to increase its strength and 
retains its cohesion will it have a greater capacity to 
attempt further changes to the party's defence policy. 
Seikoken's world V1ew 
Unlike the Nishio faction, Seikoken does not 
possess a Cold War mentality of commun i sm versus 
democracy. Its conception of international relations 1S 
that of a "community of nations" where there is detente 
between East and West and co-operation between North and 
5 South. Seikoken's vision is that of an international 
5. Yokomichi Takahiro (New Current Association) is an 
articulate exponent of this position. He was a 
member of the Diet's Special Committee on Defence and 
is presently the governor of Hokkaido. Yokomichi 
has been tipped by the press (Asahi, October 27, 
1985) and a number of party members to be a possible 
future Chairman of the JSP. See Yokomichi's 
"Security and Disarmament" in Trialogue 30/1, Summer/ 
Fall 1982; "Japan Socialist Party" in Rei Shiratori 
(ed.), Japan in the 1980s (Kodansha International, 
Tokyo: 1982). See also Yokomichi, "Soren Kyoiron 0 
doo miruka" (How to regard the theory of Soviet 
threat", Gekkan Shakaito, No. 305, December 1981. 
--
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society where international tensions are reduced; arms 
control, disarmament and nuclear free zones established; 
the United Nations strengthened; and untied aid and 
technology transferred to the South. It is felt that 
Japan can only thrive in a stable and prosperous world 
glven its dependence on external trade. Thus Japan has 
the greatest stake in promoting a peaceful international 
environment. While Seikoken is critical of both the US 
and the USSR for not curtailing their arms race, it does 
not view either with hostility. It has been suggested 
that the international outlook of Seikoken's four 
groupings is as follows: 6 
(i) New Current Association pro West 
(ii) Tanabe group pro West and pro China 
(iii) Kawakami group pro West, pro China 
and pro Soviet 
(iv) Hori group pro West and pro USSR 
Thus all four components' common denominator 1S 
a lack of hostility towards the West. 
6 • Interview with Mr. Minoru Uezumi (Tanabe group) on 
February 20, 1986. To be pro West does not mean 
that Seikoken's groupings are in the western camp. 
It means that they are friendly towards the US. 
Likewise, to be pro China or pro Soviet in Seikoken's 
context means a friendly disposition towards these 
countries too. 
~ 
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Seikoken's threat perception 
The USSR is not perceived by Seikoken to be a 
threat to Japan. Even though the USSR is recognised to 
be a great military power, Yokomichi believes that Soviet 
might is not directly targeted against Japan but against 
the US and China. He argues that it is misleading to 
view Soviet capability exclusively in military terms. 
The USSR is beset by economic problems which can only be 
eased if there is detente and economic cooperation with 
the West and Japan. Greater economic interdependence 
should be promoted between the USSR and Japan - "it is 
possible through an increase in economic interchange based 
on mutual interest to create a state of affairs in which 
no military threat can be made without considerable 
sacrifice". 7 Yokomichi prescribes that "if threat 
indeed derives from intent and military capability, we 
must devote our efforts to a diplomacy that fosters 
peaceful intent and a stable international environment; 
and to creating the conditions for relations of mutual 
trust that will help make disarmament and arms control a 
reality" .8 
The potential threat, according to Yokomichi, lS 
actually from within. The SDF poses a threat against a 
socialist regime and democracy. Yokomichi pointed out 
7. ibid., "Japan Socialist Party", p.273. 
8~ Yokomichi, "Security and Disarmament II , OPe cit., p.42. 
~ 
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that "the strength of democracy in this country (Japan) 
has yet to be tested. Can democracy in Japan control the 
military as it does in the US and Western Europe? 
it has a history of only some forty years.,,9 
Seikoken's view of the alliance 
Seikoken supported the 1980 JSP-Komeito 
Here, 
agreement which stated that the Security Treaty should be 
retained for "the time being". Dietman Ichiro Hino, a 
leader and Chief of Secretariat of Seikoken, believes that 
the Security Treaty serves as a deterrent and is 
. db' . 1 1 10 recognlse y lnternatlona aWe 
Seikoken's view: Constitutional and legal framework for 
defence 
Unlike the right-wing Nishio faction of the 
1950's, Seikoken supports the pacifist Constitution of 
Japan. It regards the SDF as "unconstitutional but 
legal" because it was established by legislation duly 
passed in the Diet. In 1984, Secretary General Tanabe 
(Seikoken) defined the SDF as "unconstitutional but legal" 
in the party's draft Action policy.11 As a result of 
stiff opposition from the left factions, which regard the 
SDF as illegal, the phrase was deleted. The compromise 
9. ibid. 
10. Asahi, October 29, 1985. 
11. Mainichi, January 26, 1984; Yomiuri, February 1, 
1984; Tokyo Shimbun, February 3, 1984. 
. 
. 
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was that the SDF is "unconstitutional but has a legal 
existence". This semantic hair-splitting has certain 
differences In nuance. To say that the SDF is "legal" 
, 
conveys a positive outlook but to label it as having a 
"legal existence" does not imply any positive value 
. d t 12 JU gemen . The right could interpret the compromise as 
half a step better than the traditional position, while 
the left side could interpret it as "illegal". 
Consequently Ishibashi was forced by the left 
not to use the expression "unconstitutional but legal". 
Seikoken's response was that "the unconstitutional but 
legal argument is to our assertions, and we welcome it, 
and if this argument on the legality of the SDF takes root 
within the party in actual fact, we will not be insistent 
about the expression to be used".13 
Seikoken's view: The appropriate military force and 
posture 
Yokomichi criticizes the pursuit of military 
strength as an insurance for security because it would 
lead to a vicious cycle of military expansionism, arms 
races and increase in international tension. He prefers 
the concept of a military force designed exclusively for 
defence. Yokomichi thinks that it is good for Japan to 
12. I would like to thank Professor Ikuro Takaq i for 
explaining to me the nuances of the phraseologies. 
13. Nihon Keizai, June 13, 1984. 
, 
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choose "the path of assymmetry with its neighbours In 
terms of military capability".14 
An examination of the available writings on 
43 
defence by Yokomichi reveals that unarmed neutrality was 
neither propagated nor criticized. While extolling the 
pacifist sentiments of Article 9, Yokomichi makes no 
mention of unarmed neutrality at all. Perhaps this 
omission suggests that he does not take unarmed neutrality 
seriously as an operational policy despite his pacifist 
leanings. 
Hino accepts armed neutrality as a viable option 
for Japan. 1S Even if Japan were to leave the alliance, 
Hino argues, the present SDF is strong enough to make any 
invasion very costly. If Japan is invaded, the SDF 
should resist with the backing of the people. Thus, Hino 
believes that if Japan were to opt for armed neutrality 
with a limited conventional posture, it would still be a 
sufficient deterrent to any potential aggressors. 
It is possible that some members of the New 
Current Association and the Tanabe group may privately 
share the defence views of their former faction leaders 
who broke away from the JSP in 1977. If this is so, it 
indicates a recognition that armed neutrality with a 
14. Takahiro Yokomichi, "Security and Disarmament", 
OPe cit., p.41. 
IS. Interview with Mr. Ichiro Hino (Kawakami group) on 
March 4, 1986. 
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moderate capability is desirable, not because it lS 
difficult to dismantle the SDF upon leaving the alliance, 
but because it is difficult to shape the real world in 
Japan's pacifist image. 
Since Seikoken, unlike the left factions, does 
not view the US with suspicion, and given their interest 
in maintaining an accord with Komeito and DSP, the 
faction could possibly push for the party's acceptance of 
the SDF as legal and for a more explicit recognition of 
the Security Treaty IIfor the time beingll. It is unlikely 
that the declaratory policy of unarmed neutrality would be 
challenged by Seikoken. Although Seikoken is on the 
right of the JSP its attitudes towards defence are 
different from those of the Nishio faction of the 1950's. 
Its reluctance to tamper further with the party's defence 
policy is also because the faction does not think that any 
major change is necessary. 
Shaken (Shakaishugi Kenkyukai [Socialism Research 
Council] ) 
Shaken, the ex-Sasaki faction, has changed its 
ideology from Marxism to social democracy. It used to be 
the dominant faction within the JSP. While it is not as 
influential as before, it augments its influence by 
aligning itself with Seikoken and the Katsumata faction. 
It supports a more "realistic ll JSP, the New Declaration 
and a coalition with Komeito and the DSP. 
. 
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Shaken has the reputation of being a pro China 
faction. This puts it at odds on foreign policy and 
defence with the pro Soviet factions : the Katsurnata 
faction and the Socialist Association. 
Shaken's world Vlew 
Shaken's international outlook is influenced by 
its pro China leanings. When China adopted the Three 
Worlds Theory in 1974 as its declaratory framework for 
analysing international relations, Shaken followed suit. 16 
China proposed a United Front with the US (classified as 
the less dangerous component of the First World); the 
Second World (Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand) and the Third World against the IIhegemonic ll power 
on the rise - the USSR. Shaken, unlike the Chinese, 
placed Japan in the Third World!17 Despite discarding 
its Marxist trappings, Shaken is reputedly close to the 
Deng Xiaoping leadership. Shaken's pro China policy may 
also be influenced by non-ideological reasons : it has 
been alleged that Shaken obtained funds from China Vla 
Chinese trade channelled through some factional members. 18 
16. Yamamoto Mitsuru, IIAn Erosion of Neutralism ll in Japan 
Center for International Exchange (ed.), The Silent 
Superpower: Japan's Identity and World Role (Simul 
Press, Tokyo: 1976), p.150. 
17. ibid. 
18. See Stockwin, OPe cit., p.122 and Chae-Jin Lee, 
"Factional Politics In The Japan Socialist Party : 
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Case ll , Asian Survey, 
No.3, March 1970, p.238. 
. 
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Shaken's threat perception 
Shaken has regarded the USSR as a threat to 
world peace and Japan. 19 This outlook leads Shaken to 
46 
the mutually contradictory policy of supporting both China 
and unarmed neutrality. If the USSR is indeed a threat, 
then it should follow China's exhortation to view the 
Security Treaty as an indispensable deterrent against the 
USSR. Shaken has avoided answering the question of how 
unarmed neutrality can be feasible if the USSR is a 
threat. Shaken was greatly embarrassed by China's 
criticism of the JSP's policy of unarmed neutrality as 
unrealistic. Nevertheless, Shaken did not abandon the 
policy of unarmed neutrality even though it regarded the 
USSR as a threat. China today no longer emphasises a 
United Front against the USSR. Shaken, on its part, has 
also been subdued in its criticism of the USSR. 
Shaken's view of the alliance 
While it had once called for the immediate 
abrogation of the Security Treaty and the SDF, Shaken, ln 
recent years, has not taken a strong line against the 
Security Treaty nor pushed for the dissolution of the SDF. 
Yugi Soga, the party's Vice Secretary General and a leader 
of Shaken, said that the faction does not insist on a 
19. Tokyo Shimbun, May 14, 1975. 
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speedy abrogation of the Security Treaty.20 As a result 
of its pro China leanings, Shaken has been more tolerant 
of the Security Treaty. Shaken's support for the 
maintenance of the Security Treaty "for the time being" 1S 
also because of its desire for the JSP's defence policy to 
be more acceptable to the centrist parties. 
Shaken's view: Constitutional and legal framework 
for defence 
Shaken views the SDF to be "unconstitutional but 
legal" . 
Shaken's view: The appropriate military force and posture 
While keeping the ideal of unarmed neutrality, 
Soga suggested an "Austrian formula" 21 for Japan. 
proposition would imply a neutral Japan with limited 
Such a 
conventional capability, guaranteed by the great powers. 
When asked about the appropriate response to a 
hypothetical invasion, Soga felt that the SDF should 
resist the aggressors. This view differs from the 
official Ishibashi line of passive resistance. 
Since Shaken is pro China and is supportive of a 
JSP-Komeito-DSP coalition, it is likely that it would, 
together with Seikoken, seek the party's recognition of 
20. Interview with Mr. Yoji Soga (Shaken) on March 3, 
1986. 
21. ibid. 
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~ 
48 
the SDF's legality and a more positive acceptance of the 
Security Treaty "for the time being". It is unlikely 
that Shaken will challenge the JSP's declaratory policy of 
unarmed neutrality. 
Katsumata faction (Seisaku Kenkyukai: [Policy Research 
Association]) 
Although the Katsumata faction is a small, 
centrist grouping, it has benefited from the rivalry 
between left and right in the party. Since a candidate 
for the Chairmanship from either the left or right may be 
unacceptable to either wing, the compromise solution of 
having a centrist Chairman is more tolerable to all. The 
Katsumata faction has played a pivotal role by siding with 
both left and right at different times. This has been a 
contributory factor to Ishibashi's political longevity. 
By occupying the top posts of the party since 1970, 
Ishibashi has been able to promote his defence plan of 
1966 as the party orthodoxy on defence. 
The Katsumata faction has officially adopted 
social democracy. Unlike the social democrats of Western 
Europe, it is rather cool towards the US and is very 
friendly towards the USSR. 
Katsumata Faction's world Vlew 
The Katsumata faction sees international 
relations in terms of tension between imperialism and 
socialism. Ishibashi wrote: "The socialist camp is 
'; 
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certainly in a shambles. To our surprise the traditional 
image of socialist countries as peaceloving has been 
mercilessly shattered ... (However) the day will surely 
come when the Soviet Union and China again have amicable 
relations. Reconciliation between the USSR and PRe 
implies a unification of all the socialist forces on the 
globe. The significance of this for Japan needs little 
explanation. ,,22 As for the western alliance, Ishibashi 
remarked: "It is completely natural for the imperialist 
camp to combine efforts in the U.S., Europe and Japan so 
as to become superior to the Soviet union".23 Ishibashi 
continued: "If the U.S. were to take retaliatory measures 
(after Japan has left the alliance), Japan could be drawn 
into another camp perhaps contrary to our wishes".24 
Despite Ishibashi's proclivity towards the USSR, 
he visited the US in 1984 to demonstrate the "realism" of 
25 the "New JSP". 
While the Katsumata faction is pro Sovi et, it lS 
unlike the Socialist Association whose support of the USSR 
is almost total. The Katsumata faction criticized the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the Soviet's participa-
tion in the arms race and the Soviet one party-
22. Mas~i Ishibashi, op. cit., p.113. 
23. ibid., p.67. 
24. ibid., p.73. 
25. Tokyo Shimbun, April 7, 1984. 
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b . 26 ureaucratlc state. Nevertheless it remalns very 
friendly towards the USSR because of ideology and close 
personal ties with the USSR. Mr. Chisato Tatebayashi, a 
CEC member from the Katsumata faction, feels that good 
economic relations with the USSR would redress some of 
Japan's trade imbalance which, he considers, is skewed 
27 towards the west. 
It is also rumoured that the faction benefits 
from trade relations with the USSR. 28 Such an activity, 
which provides a source of income to the faction, is said 
to predispose the faction to be pro Soviet. 
Katsumata faction's threat perception 
The Katsumata faction obviously does not see the 
USSR as a threat to Japan. Ishibashi wrote: liAs an 
island nation, Japan need not worry about be i ng i nvaded as 
long as it does not cause the dispute ... Even today, with 
the exception of the Japan-US Security Treaty under which 
Socialist Countries are regarded as enemies and the US 
26. Interview with Mr. Chisato Tatebayashi, Head of 
International Bureau and CEC member of JSP, on March 
6, 1986. 
27. ibid. 
28. Faction members from both left and right of the 
Katsumata faction mentioned its alleged trading 
activities. Such rumours of financial connections 
with foreign powers are not peculiar to the Katsumata 
faction alone. These allegations are floated by 
rival factions as a result of factional suspicions 
and attempts to discredit their opponents. 
. 
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armed forces are provided with military bases, there is no 
reason for other countries to invade Japan. 11 29 Moreover, 
the USSR has little to gain by the invasion of Japan. 
The faction's view is that: "If the Soviet Union should 
attack Japan without any reason, not only Japan-Soviet 
trade would be suspended, but also the Soviet Union would 
be isolated from international public opinion and east-
west trade would be disrupted, and the Soviet Union would 
invite strong reaction from the Third World with the 
result that it would be put in a very difficult position. 
Further, the Soviet economy would suffer very much. 11 30 
Katsumata faction's view of the alliance 
The faction argues that the Security Treaty is 
unnecessary as the USSR is not a threat to Japan. It lS 
an entangling alliance which would drag Japan to war. 
Ishibashi also rejects the Security Treaty because he 
"cannot believe that the US would come to help Japan at 
the risk of entry into a war which might devastate its own 
• II 31 terrltory. Even if it does, it would still be unable 
to help Japan in time to prevent an invasion of Japan. 
Ishibashi is not confident that the US nuclear deterrent 
29. Mas~i Ishibashi, Ope cit., p.39. 
30. Japan Socialist Review, No.419-420, October/ 
November 1983, p.5. The whole issue was devoted to 
the Ishibashi policy of unarmed neutrality. 
31. Mas~i Ishibashi, OPe cit., p.59. 
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the risk of entry into a war which might devastate its own 
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29. Mas~i Ishibashi, OPe cit., p.39. 
30. Japan Socialist Review, No.419-420, October/ 
November 1983, p.5. The whole issue was devoted to 
the Ishibashi policy of unarmed neutrality. 
31. Mas~i Ishibashi, OPe cit., p.59. 
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would work in the future. He commented: "the deterrent 
effect of nuclear weapons must be admitted. But not for 
a moment will I believe the nonsensical claim that they 
will never be used.,,32 
Given the Katsumata faction's scepticism about 
the alliance, why is the faction willing to tolerate the 
Security Treaty for the time being when a socialist 
coalition government is formed? Such a position is 
merely an expedient move to make the JSP an acceptable 
partner to the centrist parties. If the alliance is 
really dangerous to Japan, the Katsumata faction should 
logically support the speedy abrogation of the Security 
Treaty. 
Katsumata Faction Constitutional and legal framework 
for defence 
The faction supports the expression "The SDP lS 
unconstitutional but legal". Ishibashi explained: 
"There are two meanings to the word legal in that the SDF 
satisfies all legal procedures and that the SDP is in line 
with the spirit of the Constitution. I used the 
expression that they are legal only in terms of the 
33 procedure.". 
32. ibid., p.48. 
33. Nihon Keizai, Evening, February 28, 1984. 
~ 
• 
53 
Katsumata Faction : The appropriate military force 
and posture 
Ishibashi claims that Japan is indefensible. 
He believes that a war fought on Japanese soil may 
annihilate the Japanese people. If Japan is invaded, 
passive resistance may be adopted. Ishibashi wrote: 
IIDepending on how the adversary acts, we need to attempt 
varlous kinds of resistance that do not rely on military 
force. This resistance could take a wide range of forms 
including demonstrations, hunger strikes, boycotts, non-
cooperation and general strike. 11 34 Ishibashi also 
recommends surrender as an option if Japan is invaded. 
He wrote: IIWithout worrying about being misunderstood, I 
make it a rule to tell people that, yes, there are times 
when it is actually wiser to surrender. 11 35 
Ishibashi's view of defence is based more on 
domestic conditions than the international situation. He 
remarked that if force structure is shaped by 
international considerations, IIthis implies that the range 
of military defence can be infinitely enlarged in 
accordance with international affairs and technological 
development. This is the same as saying that the scale 
of the military has no limits or restriction. 11 36 
Ishibashi further expressed his fear that a IIthreat 
34. Mas~i Ishibashi, Ope cit., p.42. 
35. ibid. 
36. ibid., p.21. 
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mentality" may lead to the introduction of emergency 
legislation, secrecy protection legislation and a system 
of national mobilisation. These measures, he felt, could 
lead to the erosion of democracy in Japan. 37 
If military defence is undesirable, how is the 
SDF to be dissolved? Ishibashi maintains that the Four 
Conditions which he had first proposed in 1966 have to be 
met. When asked whether Japan will adopt armed 
neutrality upon leaving the Security Treaty, Ishibashi 
said that it would be the logical position for Japan. 38 
This is because the SDF will not be demobilised 
immediately upon the abrogation of the Security Treaty. 
Since the SDF could only gradually be dissolved, it is 
inevitable that Japan would pass through a process of 
armed neutrality. While unarmed neutrality is just a 
vision, armed neutrality is an operational policy for 
Ishibashi. To him, armed neutrality for Japan is more 
attractive than an "entangling" alliance with the US. 
Shinsei Kenkyukai (New Birth Research Council) 
The New Birth Research Council, formed in 1977, 
comprlses younger Dietmen previously from Shaken, the New 
Current Association, the Katsumata faction and 
37. ibid., p.8S. 
38. The question was raised at Ishibashi's seminar at the 
Peace Research Centre, Australian National University 
on April 18, 1986. 
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. d d 39 In epen ents. Thus, its members carne from 
ideologically diverse backgrounds. The major 
consideration among t~e younger Dietmembers was the desire 
to have a factional base to obtain party posts and to 
exert greater influence on the JSP. Although the faction 
has been identified as generally left leaning, it does not 
have consistent or well articulated views on party 
policies with a character of its own. Even though the 
faction is the second largest in the JSP, it is not as 
formidable as its numbers suggest because it is not 
cohesive. 
The faction is divided in its support for a "New 
JSP" and the "New Declaration". It is also unable to 
present a unified view on the controversy over the SDF's 
legality. The faction is relatively different from other 
JSP factions in that it is not ideologically oriented. 
Even though the raison d'~tre of other JSP factions is to 
attain power, they are not solely concerned with power for 
its own end but also as a means to achieve a faction's 
policy goals. However the New Birth Research Council 
does not have any obvious ideological goals beyond an 
amorphous left-leaning orientation. 
39. Asahi, august 10, 1977; Asahi, November 15, 1981. 
i 
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New Birth Research Association : The lack of a world Vlew 
The faction does not share a common outlook 
towards the great powers. However, the faction supports 
North Korea. It is rumoured that the faction receives 
f ' '1' f h 40 lnanCla asslstance rom t at country. The faction's 
pro North Korea orientation disposes it to see the US 
presence in North East Asia in a negative light. 
New Birth Research Council : The lack of a defence policy 
The faction does not possess a defence policy 
with its own character. However, some members of the 
faction participate in a supra factional organisation, The 
Comprehensive Strategy for Peace Research Council, set up 
in 1983 with the declared task of preserving unarmed 
l ' l' 41 neutra lty as party po lCy. While the Council also 
includes Socialist Association members, most of the 
Dietmembers in this supra factional organisation are from 
the New Birth Research Council. 
When the controversy over the SDF's legality 
erupted, the Comprehensive Strategy for Peace Research 
Council succeeded in checking Ishibashi's attempt to 
recognise the SDF as legal. 42 
40. Not surprisingly, allegations were made by the 
right wing of the JSP. 
41. Asahi, March 26, 1983; Tokyo Shimbun, April 1, 1983. 
42. Mainichi, January 26, 1984. 
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Nob or u Baba, the JSP ex-Secretary General and a 
leader of the faction, was very critical of Ishibashi's 
position that the SPF was legal. 43 Baba and his group are 
said to be bitter about Ishibashi having profited from 
toppling the Asukata-Baba leadership. Since the "SDF lS 
legal" controversy is a symbol of Ishibashi's 
determination for a more "realistic" JSp,44 Baba and 
others in the faction did not hesitate to challenge 
Ishibashi on both policy and personal grounds. 
Socialist Association (Shakaishugi Kyokai) 
The Socialist Association advocates Marxist-
Leninism; the JSP as a class party; the Socialist 
transformation of Japan through revolution and a United 
Front with the JCP. Even though its Diet arm, the 
Sagatsukai (March Association), is small in numbers, the 
Socialist Association has won over many local party 
activists. These Socialist Association activists were 
influential at the important annual Party Convention while 
JSP Dietmen did not have the automatic right to vote at 
the Convention. By 1977, it was at the peak of its 
power. 
Alarmed by the Socialist Association's growlng 
influence, an anti-Kyokai alignment was forged between the 
43. Asahi, October 15, 1984. 
44. Nihon Keizai, February 29, 1984. 
. 
. 
58 
Eda faction, the New Current Association and Shaken. The 
policy of unarmed neutrality was also used against the 
Socialist Association. The anti-Kyokai factions attacked 
the Socialist Association for its alleged intentions of 
revising the IIbourgeoisll peace Constitution and also for 
't d d' 45 l S suppose stu les on rearmament. 
The limited changes to the JSP's defence policy 
In the 1980's are related to the decline of the Socialist 
Association. Its decline is a necessary condition before 
changes in the JSP's defence policy can be made. If the 
Socialist Association had not declined after 1977, it 
would have been extremely difficult even to make limited 
changes to the party's defence policy. 
Why has the Socialist Association declined? 
The combination of anti-Kyokai and Sohyo succeeded In 
giving all Dietmembers the automatic right to vote at 
, 46 party conventlons. Since the Socialist Association has 
only a small Diet representation, its influence at party 
conventions has diminished. 
The declining attraction of Marxism works to the 
disadvantage of the Socialist Association. In addition, 
the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, the excesses of the 
Cultural Revolution, the Sino-Soviet conflict, the 
warring socialist states of Kampuchea, Vietnam and China, 
45. 
46. 
Tokyo Shimbun, ay 17, 1977. 
Tokyo Shimbun, July 20, 
Nihon Keizai, March 17, 
1977; 
1978. 
Asahi, July 30, 1977; 
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and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan have 
cumulatively damaged the image of socialist states. 
With th~ rise of affluence in Japan, the general 
environment has become less conducive to radicalism. The 
classical Marxist doctrine of the "impoverishment of the 
workers", revolution, and the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat" has little relevance and appeal to the 
overwhelming majority of Japanese who consider themselves 
to be middle class. In Marxist terms, there has been a 
process of "embourgeoisement" of the masses and a decline 
in the "consciousness" of the workers. 
Many JSP members now consider Marxism to be 
obsolete. The social democrats within the JSP percelve 
that the fortunes of the party will continue to sink 
unless Marxist dogmas are scuttled by the party. This 
trend towards social democracy has posed a threat to the 
long term existence of the Socialist Association. 
The Socialist Association's cohesion has been 
rocked by secessions and divisions. Yutaka Fukuda, a 
Hosei University professor, together with some Socialist 
Association members, left the organisation in 1984 as a 
result of ideological disputes. 47 Fukuda leans towards 
Eurocommunism and feels that Marxist-Leninism is no longer 
appropriate to Japan. Moreover Fukuda opposed the 
faction's support for the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. 
47. Yomiuri, March 2, 1984. 
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The faction suffered yet another blow when their 
doyen, Professor Itsuro Sakisaka, died in 1985. The 
faction has since been divided into two groups: the 
right-wing Yamamoto group which prefers Eurocommunism and 
extends expedient support to the New Declaration; and the 
Yamaguchi group which adheres to the Sakisaka line of 
. h d 48 Marxlst ort 0 oxy. 
Although the Socialist Association has been 
split, the Sakisaka group, fortified by Marxist ideology, 
is single-minded, disciplined and dedicated to its cause. 
This group has shrewdly augmented its limited strength 
with larger numbers from the New Birth Research Council to 
form the supra factional Comprehensive Strategy for Peace 
Research Council. The supra factional organisation has 
the avowed aim of resisting any tampering with the JSP's 
policy of unarmed neutrality.49 
The Socialist Association still retains the 
support of a third of the party secretariat. 50 Their 
supporters in the party bureaucracy can hinder the 
implementation of policies opposed by the Socialist 
Association. It can also count on the grassroots support 
that the Socialist Association has built up over the 
years. Thus, it can still fight a stubborn rearguard 
action against changes to the JSP's defence policy. 
48. Asahi, January 23, 1985. 
49. Mainichi, January 26, 1984. 
50. Nihon Keizai, Evening, June 21, 1984. 
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Socialist Association's World View 
The Sakisaka group sees international relations 
as a contradiction between socialism and imperialism. 
It is very hostile to the US lIimperialists li . It glves 
almost total support to the USSR. When the USSR 
intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Socialist 
Association claimed that lithe military intervention In 
Czechoslovakia does not mean hegemony. It was nothing 
but the revolutionary side's attitude against counter-
1 · . II 51 revo utlonarles . As for the Kurile islands, they 
maintain that this territory should be retained by the 
USSR and not returned to IIbourgeoisli Japan. 52 While the 
official policy of the JSP was to condemn the Soviet 
intervention of Afghanistan, the faction unfailingly 
extended its support to the USSR. 53 
The Socialist Association in the 1980's has been 
less cohesive in its international outlook especially 
after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. 54 Fukuda 
criticized the Sakisaka group for echoing the Soviet line. 
The Yamamoto group, attracted by Eurocommunism, also does 
not see the world in bi-polar terms. 
, I 
Toshio Otsuka, the 
51. Tokyo Shimbun, May 14, 1975. 
52 . ibid. 
53. Nihon Keizai, February 11, 1980. 
54. Interview with Professor Yutaka Fukuda, ex-Socialist 
Association member, on March 1, 1986. 
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CEC member from the Socialist Association, also pointed 
out the inadequacy of the Marxist framework in analysing 
international relations especially when socialist 
t . b d f' . . 1 . 55 coun r1es are, y e 1n1t1on, peace oV1ng. 
Besides ideology, it is rumoured that the 
Socialist Association has received funds from the USSR. 56 
Since the faction is close to the USSR and is extremely 
hostile to the US, it deviates from the party's ideal of 
neutralism. 
Socialist A~ociation's threat perceptions 
The Socialist Association believes that there 1S 
no Soviet threat because there is no cause for conflict 
between Japan and the USSR. The real threat is perceived 
to come from the SDF since it props up the capitalist 
order. The SDF is "bound up with American imperialism 
against Soviet (socialist) military forces and is the 
imperialistic army of the Japanese capitalist monopoly".57 
55. Interview with Mr. Toshio Otsuka (Socialist 
Association), Director of Press Bureau and CEC member 
of JSP on March 3, 1986. 
56. Professor Fukuda mentioned that the Soviets did 
approach the Socialist Association in 1975 to offer 
financial assistance to it. According to Fukuda, 
the offer was declined. Subsequently, the Soviets 
offered a more subtle way of funding. They offered 
to buy the factdon's magazines. Fukuda was 
insistent that the Soviet offer was rejected. 
57. Tamatsu Sato, 
(liThe fight for unarmed neutrality, which is 
difficult but promising"). Shakaishugi (Socialism). 
May 1984, No.5, p.16. 
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It is believed that the SDF is always prepared to act 
against the opposition parties and mass movements. 
Socialist Association's perception of the alliance 
It sees the alliance as undesirable because it 
serves the narrow interests of the ruling class. The 
faction asserts that "Japanese capital monopoly and the 
LDP have the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty for the 
purpose of maintaining capitalism and their own 
security".58 Since the Socialist Association is 
extremely hostile to the alliance, it would welcome the 
speedy abrogation of the Security Treaty. 
Socialist Association : The Constitution and the legal 
framework for defence 
The faction claims to have a "perfect" 
understanding of the Constitution. 59 The policy of 
unarmed neutrality is consistent with Article 9. It 
opposes the view that the "SDF is unconstitutional but 
legal" . Such a view contradicts Article 98 which 
stipulates that "this Constitution shall be the supreme 
law of the nation, and no law, ordinance, imperial 
rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, 
contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force 
58. ibid., p.15. 
59. Interview with Mr. Tamatsu Sato, Secretary General of 
Socialist Association, on February 26, 1986. 
or validity". Since the SDF is unconstitutional, it 
cannot be legal. 
Socialist Association : The appropriate military force 
and posture 
Unarmed neutrality is proclaimed as a "peace 
64 
promoting security policy with which to fight the alliance 
and the expansionist intentions of the LDP government".60 
The promotion of unarmed neutrality is seen to be not 
merely a vision but should be an activity involving the 
f d ' f' 61 masses to sa eguar a pac1 1st Japan. 
Since there are no external threats to Japan, 
the SDF should be dismantled. However, the faction is 
sceptical about whether Ishibashi's Four Conditions would 
be sufficient to ensue the smooth dissolution of the SDF. 
It commented: "These Four Conditions do not include the 
treatment of possible resistence from the SDF".62 
Therefore it is necessary to mobilise the masses against 
the SDF. It implicitly criticized the Ishibashi Plan as 
inadequate by insisting that "the Four Conditions will be 
meaningless unless the SDF is paralysed by a series of 
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mass struggle". It believes that it is not possible to 
60. Nihon Shakaito to hibuso churitsu (Japan Socialist 
Party's Unarmed Neutrality), Jungatsusha, Tokyo: 
1984, p.16. 
61 . ibid., p. 8 . 
62 . ibid., p. 2 7 . 
63. ibid., p ~ 32. 
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dissolve the SDF unless the capitalist system is replaced 
by the socialist system. It said: "The dissolution of 
the army does not necessarily go well even if the process 
is given time. On the contrary, delay may work to the 
advantage of the old establishment. Taking this into 
consideration, the coalition government and the National 
Front must achieve a socialist revolution as early as 
possible, because the dissolution is not completed until 
the stage of socialism is reached. ,,64 
How can the masses be mobilised and can a 
"reactionary" army be resisted? The faction claims that 
it is a "historical truth" that the army would collapse ln 
a social revolution if it is directed against its own 
people 65 . There had been disagreement within the 
Socialist Association before about whether Japan should 
adopt passive resistance or establish a revolut i onary 
people's militia. Sakisaka "doubted that the Japanese 
working class could maintain or even keep control of an 
effective armed force which would be only too likely to 
become an instrument of capitalist oppression.,,65 
However it would be ideologically consistent to argue that 
a socialist army is desirable when capitalism has been 
replaced by socialism. 
64. ibid. 
65. ibid. Curiously, Iran was given as an example where 
the army could not resist the mobilised populace. 
The Bolshevik Revolution and the refusal of the 
Tsarist army to act against the people, would have 
been ,- ideologically, more appropriate. 
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What policy should Japan adopt when leaving the 
alliance? Otsuka believes that it has to pass through a 
long process of armed neutrality.67 On the other hand, 
both Fukuda and YOshio Ishizawa thought that armed 
neutrality should not be adopted as part of the process 
towards the ideal of unarmed neutrality.68 Such a 
position is logically impossible unless Japan 
simultaneously disbands the SDF upon leaving the alliance. 
Maruyama, the head of the JSP's Foreign Affairs 
and Defence Committee, believes that the Socialist 
Association's support for "unarmed neutrality" is just a 
charade. Maruyama claimed that "there is within my party 
the growing infiltration of alien elements which have been 
manipulated from the outside and is determined to make use 
of the 'unarmed neutrality policy' to weaken Japan. A 
prominent advocate of these elements has recently by his 
writings advised the public to capitulate to the Soviets 
in time of hostilities and to make a socialistic 
transformation in Japan. After this transformation, the 
other representatives of these elements have insisted that 
Japan should abandon the 'unarmed neutrality policy' and 
join actively the military alliance with the Soviet Union 
66. Stockwin, OPe cit., p.133. 
67. Interview with Otsuka, OPe cit. 
68. Interviews with Fukuda and with Mr. Yoshio Ishizuka 
(Sangatsukai), Director of Planning Department, JSP. 
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for the cause of joint struggle against imperialism. 1I69 
In short, Maruyama believes that the real position of the 
Socialist Association is to adopt unarmed neutrality as a 
deceitful scheme to leave Japan vulnerable to the USSR. 
Subsequently, socialist Japan would become part of the 
Soviet alliance. Such a view, however, is not the 
official declaratory policy of the Socialist Association. 
Unarmed Neutrality as a policy has also been 
used by the Socialist Association to achieve other ends. 
One objection to the JSP's coalition with the centrist 
parties is that it threatens the party principle of 
unarmed neutrality. In fact, the converse is also true. 
The Socialist Association clings to unarmed neutrality to 
check a possible coalition between the JSP, Komeito and 
the DSP. Since the changing of the JSP's defence policy 
is often claimed to be a prerequisite to a coal i tion, the 
successful opposition to changes in the JSP's defence 
policy by the Socialist Association could make a coalition 
between the three parties less tenable. The opportunism 
of the Socialist Association can be seen by its preference 
for a United Front with the JCP. Even though armed 
neutrality is the defence policy of the JCP, the Socialist 
Association prefers a coalition with the JCP. Although 
the Socialist Association claims to be a staunch advocate 
69. Mr. Hiroyuki Maruyama's unpublished memorandum which 
was sent to the Christian Science Monitor. This 
paper was made available to me by Maruyama. 
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of unarmed neutrality, it does not prescribe unarmed 
neutrality as a condition to be met by the JCP before a 
United Front is acceptable. It ignores the JCP's non 
adherence to unarmed neutrality. Yet it opposes the JSP-
Komeito and DSP coalition on the grounds that party 
principles, especially unarmed neutrality, might be 
sacrificed for the sake of political expediency. 
However, both the Socialist Association and the JCP could 
agree to the abrogation of the Security Treaty without any 
delay. 
The Heretic : Hiroyuki Maruyama on Defence 
Factionalism is paradoxically both an 
advantage and a disadvantage to Maruyama, the Chairman of 
the JSP's Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. He does 
not belong to any faction. He would have been more 
influential if he had the backing of a faction or an 
alignment of factions. On the other hand, the left 
factions have been unable to get rid of him. Ishibashi 
called him an leccentric"70 but is powerless to remove 
him from his post even though Maruyama's views contradict 
the official Ishibashi line on defence. 
The left factions are unable to get the other 
factions to move in concert to censure Maruyama. Thus, 
he is tacitly tolerated by the right factions. By 
70. Short interview with Mr. Mas~i Ishibashi on April 
18,1986. 
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turning a blind eye to Maruyama, the right factions have 
avoided reopening the divisive issue of defence. 
Moreover, the right factions are committed to the 
promotion of a coalition government and the creation of an 
image of a more "realistic" JSP. Had Maruyama been axed 
from his post, a bad impression would have been given to 
the centrist parties that the JSP is intransigent on 
defence and that the left is calling the tune. Moreover, 
the removal of Maruyama could possibly generate negative 
publicity for the party's new image of "realism". 
That no one is able to remove Maruyama has less 
to do with the "democratic nature" of the JSP than the 
factional nature of the JSP. There is the anomalous 
situation in which the Chairman of the party's Committee 
of Foreign Affairs and Defence publicly disagreed with the 
party's official defence policy and is still able to 
retain his post. Ishibashi is unable to remove Maruyama 
while Maruyama is unable to obtain any approval for his 
proposals on defence. 
Maruyama's Threat Perception 
M . I ., f h 71 aruyama 1S acute y SUSP1C10US 0 t e USSR. 
When he was a student in Yugoslavia, the Soviet invaded 
71. Maruyama's views on defence can be found in The Japan 
Times, October 23, 1985; Shokun, November 1985; 
Sankei, October 2, 1985. The subsequent discussion 
of Maruyama's views is drawn from an interview 
conducted on March 4, 1986. 
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Czechoslovakia. Ever since, Maruyama has been convinced 
that the USSR has no compunction against using military 
power to achieve its ends. He was also impressed by 
Yugoslavia's ability to maintain its independence by the 
adoption of armed neutrality. 
Through his reading of Soviet military doctrine, 
he is convinced that it is basically offensive, seeking 
the advantage of military superiority and pre-emptive 
attack. He felt that "by fully utilizing the power 
projection potential of its naval forces, the Soviet Union 
intends to apply enormous pressure both politically and 
militarily in order to ultimately 'neutralise' Japan and 
secure the 'free use' of Japan's three international 
straits - rrsushima, Tsugaru and Soya ... ".72 Maruyama 
argued that "in the event of an armed conflict between the 
US and the Soviet Union, a localised invasion against 
Hokkaido that faces the three strategic straits may not be 
73 
completely ruled out". 
Maruyama's perception of the alliance 
To Maruyama, the alliance is the best option for 
Japan today and also in the immediate future. Beyond 
that, Japan should judge whether the alliance or armed 
neutrality is best for Japan. Maruyama criticised the 
party's unarmed neutrality policy as unrealistic and 
72. ibid., Shokun, 
73. ibid. 
working to serve the interests of the USSR. 
Maruyama's View: Constitutional and legal framework 
for defence 
71 
Maruyama argued that Article 9 was framed on the 
assumption that Japan could depend on the proposed UN 
Collective Security System for its safety. The lack of 
unanimity among the "Big Five" powers in the UN and the 
advent of the Cold War rendered the scheme unworkable. 
Thus, Article 9 should be "creatively" interpreted as 
permitting defensive defence for Japan. 
Maruyama held the view that the SDF is 
constitutional and legal. Nevertheless, he supported the 
attempts to consider the SDF as "unconstitutional but 
legal" as a tactical move because it is still an 
improvement over the traditional JSP position that the SDF 
1S illegal. 
Maruyama is by no means alone in the JSP 1n 
considering the SDF as constitutional and legal. Some 
medium ranking and young secretaries of the JSP 
Secretariat believe that to attain power, the JSP must be 
more "realistic" in its defence policy. They criticise 
the "view that the SDF is unconstitutional but to exist 
legally is not sufficient. Arguments in the party must 
be brought even to the view that (the SDF) is 
constitutional and legal".74 
74. Nihon Keizai, August 24, 1984. 
Maruyama's view: The appropriate military force 
and posture 
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He argued that Japan today needs to strengthen 
the SDF, even if it were to breach the 1% GNP ceiling. 
If Japan were to opt for armed neutrality in the future, 
it should not acquire offensive capability such as 
aircraft carriers and attack submarines. 
What if the USSR were to threaten a neutral 
Japan? Maruyama believes that the possession of nuclear 
weapons by Japan is an option in the last resort. A 
neutral Japan retains the option of seeking alignments 
with other powers if the international situation demands a 
different policy. In short, Maruyama rejects the policy 
of unarmed neutrality. 
The nature of JSP factionalism and defence 
JSP factions, unlike LDP factions, are not 
simply composed of "personal cliques". Ideology and 
policy issues, especially defence, are important. The 
defence policy of the respective factions are invariably 
influenced by their ideological orientation. The 
exception is the New Birth Research Council. Beyond an 
amorphous left-leaning orientation, it lacks a well-
defined ideology and defence policy. Nevertheless, its 
individual members' attitudes lean towards the left on 
defence. 
Within the LDP, the Nakasone faction has a 
reputation of being "hawkish" while the Komoto faction 
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(ex-Miki) has been considered to be relatively "dovish". 
It is not possible to classify the other LDP factions 
because members within a particular faction may hold 
contrasting views on defence. The holding of a similar 
policy outlook by members of the same faction is not 
necessarily important for the LDP factions. What really 
matters is patronage and opportunities for advancement 
through factional support. 
While JSP factions are ideologically oriented, 
socialist factions are also vehicles for obtaining party 
and parliamentary positions. The New Birth Research 
Council is an extreme example where a factional base to 
obtain party posts and influence is the prime motive 
rather than a shared ideology among its members. 
JSP factions are not free from personalistic 
leader-follower relationships. The most ideologically 
motivated faction, the Socialist Association, had for its 
head Professor Sakisaka whose leadership stemmed from his 
charisma, intellect and moral prestige. 75 It is argued 
that "very few Socialist Dietmen who take the meaning of 
Re~sonalistic factors (e.g. in terms of patron-clientele 
relationships) to be that literally found in the case of 
conservative factionalism. Rather, they see it as 
75. Professor Sakisaka was purged from Kyushu University 
in 1928 and was imprisoned in 1937 for two years. 
He wrote numerous books on Marxism and had translated 
a 27-volume complete works of Marx and Engels into 
Japanese. See The Japan Times Weekly, February 9, 
1985. 
something like a leader-follower relationship in the 
philosophical dimension. ,,76 
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Defence policy has also been used as a factional 
weapon to undermine the policy preferences and the power 
position of rival factions. In the struggle against the 
Socialist Association in 1977, the anti-Kyokai factions 
accused the Socialist Association of not maintaining the 
pacifist Constitution and of conducting studies on 
"rearmament". Such anti-party behaviour, the anti-Kyokai 
factions implied, ran counter to the policy of unarmed 
neutrality. The Socialist Association has resisted 
attempts to regard the SDF as legal, a policy which has 
the advantage of maintaining an obstacle to the JSP's 
coalition with the centrist parties. 
Opportunism for factional power is often inter-
twined with ideological preferences. The attainment of 
power will make the adoption of a favoured policy 
alternative or ideological orientation more likely. To 
be able to obtain ideological leadership would lead to 
political leadership of the JSP. Thus, ideological and 
policy issues have been keenly contested by the various 
factions. Defence policy is no exception to this pattern 
of socialist factional behaviour. Defence policies of 
the various JSP factions have been both a means to an end 
and an end in itself. 
76. Kamo Takehiko, "An Empirical Analysis of Factionalism 
in the Japan Socialist party", IPSJ Papers, No.6, 
1975, p.7. 
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The defence policy of the JSP is shaped by 
compromises between factions with competing viewpoints. 
The contention between the centre and right factions 
(which argued that the SDF was legal) and the left 
factions (which insisted that the SDFwas illegal) resulted 
in the compromise solution that the SDF has a "legal 
existence". The official defence policy often settles 
for the lowest common denominator and is often ambiguous 
and ambivalent. 
All the factions can agree on ideals like 
disarmament, arms control, establishment of nuclear free 
zones, peace diplomacy with all countries and the 
declaratory policy of unarmed neutrality. However with 
differing world views, the factions have different 
perceptions and levels of hostility towards the US and the 
Japan-US Security Treaty. Seikoken (fr i endly towards the 
US) and Shaken (pro China) are more tolerant of the 
Security Treaty "for the time being". The Katsumata 
faction and Socialist Association (pro Soviet factions) 
are more eager for a speedy abrogation of the Security 
Treaty.- Given the dissimilar factional outlook on when 
and how the Security Treaty should be abrogated, the 
ambiguous official policy states only that negotiations 
will be needed with the US without any mention whether the 
alliance will be abrogated as soon as possible or will be 
maintained in the foreseeable future. 
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The party's defence policy is also influenced by 
the relative strength of the factions and factional 
ability to align with other factions so as to shift the 
balance of power to its advantage. If either the 
factions on the left or right are dominant, it is likely 
that the official defence policy will be closer to their 
preferred position. The ability of the Katsumata faction 
to be in the mainstream since 1970 has contributed to the 
recognition of the Ishibashi Plan as the official party 
policy. 
A faction's power can be increased by its 
success in placing its candidates in the two top party 
posts, the Chairmanship and the Secretary Generalship; 
the CEC; the party secretariat; the level of support at 
the annual national party convention; fact i on members 
elected to public office and trade union support. 
Seikoken's increasing power can be attributed to its 
success In meeting the above criteria of party influence. 
A faction's influence is also dependent on the 
faction's cohesion; the level of commitment and interests 
to a particular policy area; the faction's skill in 
forging alignment; political manoeuvering and factional 
in-fighting. 77 The Sakisaka group is committed to resist 
any further shift to the right by the JSP on defence. It 
77. For a summary of the variables of factional power, 
see Stockwin, OPe cit., p.1S8. 
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has also aligned itself with larger numbers from the New 
Birth Research Council to check further changes to the 
party's defence policy. Despite its relative decline 
since 1977, the Socialist Association still poses a 
formidable obstacle to further changes to the JSP's 
defence policy. 
The decision making process of the JSP is not 
conducive to policy change especially when the subject is 
a contentious issue like defence. Former JSP Chairman 
Asukata lamented: "When the leadership determines to do 
something new or resolve to change policies that are 
already in force, it must be very careful and expand 
enormous effort on creating a consensus. When I was In 
office, I sweated blood over this task ... this is not 
true of all political parties. Indeed I believe that it 
lS particularly marked in the case of the JSp.,,78 
~ 
However, failure by the mainstream factions to 
compromise on defence will alienate the anti-mainstream 
factions resulting in factional strife that may spillover 
to other policy areas being pursued by mainstream 
, 
factions. ' (The three salient policy areas of the JSP In 
the 1980's involve debate about: a coalition with the 
centrist parties; rejuvenation of the JSP; and adoption 
of the New Declaration). If the dominant factions are 
78. Asukata Ichio, "Reflections on My Term as JSP 
Chairman", Japan Echo, Vol. X, No.4, 1983, p.27. 
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perceived to pursue a "zero-sum game", it may even lead to 
a party schism. 
Given the factional nature of the JSP, changes 
In its defence policy are extremely difficult, acrimonious 
and if they do take place, are generally incremental and 
forged by compromises between factions of conflicting 
outlook and interest. 
CHAPTER THREE 
INTER-PARTY DYNAMICS : COALITION POLITICS AND DEFENCE 
The following questions will be addressed In 
this chapter: 
(i) What is "coalition politics?" 
(ii) What is the impact of "coalition politics" 
on the JSP's defence policy? 
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(iii) What is the consequence for "coalition 
politics" if the JSP changes or fails to change 
its defence policy? 
Coalition Politics 
By the mid 1970's, the opposition parties 
anticipated that the LDP could lose its narrow majority ln 
the Diet. It was hoped that an emerging parity of 
strength in the Diet between the LDP on the one hand, and 
the opposition parties on the other, would present 
opportunities for the opposition parties to share power by 
forging a coalition among themselves or with the LDP. A 
coalition with other parties is the only avenue to power 
for an opposition party because none has sufficient seats 
in the Diet to form a government by itself in the 
foreseeable future. 
"Coalition politics" refers to the manoeuvres by 
various political parties to keep their options open and 
to build bridges with potential coalition partners in the 
hope of forming a coalition government in the event of the 
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LDP losing its slim majority or of a split within the 
factionalised LDP. It also entails the reconsideration 
of their defence policies in order to enhance their 
acceptability to other potential coalition partners. 
The impact of "Coalition Politics" on JSP's defence policy 
The "coalition" dilemma 
The dilemma faced by the JSP leadership is how a 
coalition strategy could be pursued without disrupting the 
internal cohesion of the party.l The JSP's potential 
partners, the DSP and Komeito, have both insisted that the 
adoption of "realistic" policies by the JSP is a pr10r 
condition of coalition with the JSP. The DSP's position 
is that "it is not possible to form a government together 
with the JSP with its irresponsible diplomatic and defence 
policy".2 Komeito's policy is that the party "will not 
adopt diplomatic and defence policies, which are contrary 
to the common sense of the people and if the JSP 1S 
impossible, with regards to those points, we will (have 
to) consider new responses".3 
1. Terry E. MacDougall, "Asukata Ichio and some 
dilemmas of Socialist Leadership in Japan", in Terry 
E. MacDougall (ed.), Political Leadership in 
Contemporary Japan, Michigan Papers in Japanese 
Studies, 1982, No. I, pp.68-84. 
2. Nihon Keizai, May 22, 1980. 
3. ibid. 
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The left faction of the JSP, the Socialist 
Association, is hostile to a coalition involving the JSP, 
Komeito and DSP. Its preference is for a United Front 
with the JCP. An all opposition party coalition that 
includes the JCP is unacceptable not only to the DSP and 
Komeito but also to the right factions within the JSP. 
There is a fear within the party that the pursuit of a 
coalition strategy might be at the expense of party 
principles, especially unarmed neutrality. The view that 
compromlses with other parties are unacceptable if they 
are to lead to the further rearmament of Japan, is not 
confined only to the Socialist Association. 4 
The right factions within the JSP are prepared 
to make limited changes to the party's defence policy. 
However they are dismayed at the centrist parties 
increasing movement towards the LDP's position on 
5 defence. Even if the defence policy preferences of the 
right factions could be implemented, the policy gap on 
defence between the JSP and the centrist parties would 
still be wide. Though the right factions are keen to 
forge a coalition with the centrist parties, they are 
hesitant to make the sweeping changes to the party's 
4. -Chisato Tatebayashi (Katsumata faction), Director 
General of the International Bureau and CEC member, 
strongly emphasised this point. Interview on March 
6, 1986. 
5. Interview with Mr. Ichiro Hino (Kawakami group, 
Seikoken) on March 4, 1986. 
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defence policy demanded by both DSP and Komeito. Not 
only would a rightward shift of the party's defence policy 
lead to destructive factional strife, but it would also 
weaken its role of checking the LDP on defence. 
The contradictions between the JSP and the centrist 
parties' defence policies 
Another dilemma for the JSP is the growlng gap 
between the defence policies of the JSP and the centrist 
parties. If Komeito and DSP were to continue moving 
closer to the LDP's position on defence, the resulting 
isolation of the JSP on defence would also weaken its 
inhibitive role against the LDP. Moreover, the widening 
policy gap could also complicate the JSP's hopes of 
forming a coalition government with the centrist parties. 
By 1975, the DSP had adopted a positive attitude 
towards the Security Treaty. Prior to that, the DSP 
called for the gradual dissolution of the Security Treaty, 
the non-stationing of US forces in Japan, and the 
introduction of US forces only in the event of an 
6 
emergency. Thus, the previous DSP's defence policy 
envisaged armed neutrality for Japan in the long term. 
The DSP's defence policy in the 1980's differ 
little from the LDP's. In October 1980, the LDP and DSP 
had a consensus on defence policy.7 It is noted that 
6. Sankei, November 11, 1975. 
7. Nihon Keizai, October 25, 1980. 
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" the DSP is supportive of the LDP on most defence 
issues. Indeed, at times, the DSP has appeared more 
hawkish on defence matters than the right of the LDP".8 
Komeito had initially preferred to abrogate the 
Security Treaty and to adopt lightly armed neutrality for 
Japan. It had earlier considered the SDF to be 
unconstitutional. By the end of 1981, Komeito had 
decided that the USSR was a threat to Japan, that it 
wished to maintain the Security Treaty, and that the SDF 
was constitutional. Komeito has continued to insist that 
defence spending should be limited to 1 % GNP ceiling and 
that Japan should only have sufficient equipment to repel 
9 
an enemy lIat the water's edge ll • 
Both the DSP and Komeito are prepared to discuss 
"1' , f 10 approprlate ml ltary equlpment or Japan. The JSP, 
in contrast, has avoided such discussions because to 
suggest a better choice of weapons would be to concede to 
the LDP the principle of armaments for Japan. 
The DSP and Komeito, by shifting their defence 
policies closer to the LDP, hope to enhance their chances 
of forming a coalition government with the LDP. By 
criticizing the JSP's defence policy, they can portray 
8. J.W.M. Chapman, R. Drifte, I.T.M. Gow, Japan's Quest 
for Comprehensive Security (Frances Pinter, London: 
1983), p.1S. 
9. The Japan Times Weekly, September 26, 1981; 
Shimbun, February 3, 1982. 
Tokyo 
10. Asahi, October 25, 1980; 
September 7, 1981. 
Nihon Keizai, Evening, 
84 
themselves as "realistic" and responsible while also 
impressing the LDP that they are suitable coalition 
partners. 
Faced with long-term electoral decline and 
pressure from the centrist parties, the JSP in the 1980's 
attempted to adopt "realistic policies" in order to 
demonstrate its credibility as a responsible party capable 
of holding power. In January 1980, the JSP and the 
Komeito made a pact with the aim of future co-operation. 
The JCP was excluded as a suitable coalition part ner. 
The two parties also agreed that the Security Treaty would 
be dissolved through negotiation and that Japan should opt 
for disarmament and neutrality.11 Such a defence posture 
was consistent with the Ishibashi Plan of 1966. 
Komeito had earlier signed an agreement with the 
DSP ln 12 December 1979. Both parties agreed to maintain 
the Security Treaty for the time being. The long term 
alm would be abrogation of the Security Treaty. The SDF 
would also be maintained but its "re-organization" might 
be "studied" in the future. Thus the DSP conceded to 
Komeito the possibility of reducing the SDF. All three 
parties were eager to patch together agreements on defence 
policies in anticipation of the June 1980 Elections. 
This led to the comment that "the opposition parties are 
11. Tokyo Shimbun, January 11, 1980. 
12. Mainichi, December 7, 1979. 
apt to debate defence matters in connection with the 
concept of a coalition government". 13 
The Asukata leadership nevertheless expressed 
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its reservations with the DSP: "If the DSP is to take its 
present direction of militarization, there cannot be a 
JSP-Komeito-DSP line". 14 Asukata believed that "if the 
time ripens, the Security Treaty and the SDF will be 
abolished even during the time of the coalition 
government". 15 This aspiration of Asukata was 
conveniently left out of the JSP-Komeito agreement on 
defence. 
Just before the 1980 National elections, Asukata 
expediently said: lilt is absolutely clear that such 
assertions as non-armament, non-alignment and positive 
neutrality, which are matters on the plane of the party 
platform, will not be an obstacle to forming a coalition 
with other parties and that they must also not be 
permitted to become obstacles". 16 Yet Asukata also 
mentioned that lithe spirit of the basic party policies of 
non-armament, non-alignment and positive neutrality will 
be maintained firmly, under whatever circumstances 
17 (and) ... we cannot go back on them". Thus, 
13. Nihon Keizai, June 16, 1980. 
14. Yomiuri, February 11, 1980. 
15. Tokyo Shimbun, January 12, 1980. 
16. Nihon Keizai, Evening, May 2, 1980. 
17. ibid. 
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contradictory statements were made just prior to the 
National elections which could hardly enhance the 
credibility of the JSP. 
Contrary to the hopes of the opposition, the LDP 
won convincingly the 1980 General Elections. The 
differences between the three opposition parties' defence 
policies which had been papered over just prior to the 
elections resurfaced as the anticipated defeat of the LDP 
did not materialize. By September 1981, Komeito 
threatened to review the JSP-Komeito pact "if the JSP does 
not make realistic responses on the three major policies 
for security, defence and energy".18 The gap between the 
JSP and Komeito widened at the end of 1981 as Komeito re-
evaluated the Security Treaty more favourably and 
considered the SDF to be constitutional. In November 
1981, Asukata decided to shelve the JSP-Komeito pact. He 
insisted that lithe JSP-Komeito Agreement means that we 
will decrease and re-organize the SDF, will abrogate the 
Security Treaty in future, will hold firm to disarmament 
in an overall scale and to (an) anti-nuclear weapons 
policy. We abide by it. I want them (Komeito) to abide 
by it as well. 11 19 Predictably, the Socialist Association 
also criticised the JSP-Komeito pact as meaningless since 
18. Mainichi, Evening, September 3, 1981. 
19. Sankei, November 27, 1981. 
.fT. 
II r 
. ~ I 
I 
t 
87 
Komelto had shifted towards the right on defence. 20 The 
JSP, in January 1982, criticised the DSP for considering a 
coalition with the LDP: "(The DSP) is aiming at a 
conservative-middle of the road government and recently, 
it is falling in line with the LDP on defence ... 
forgetting its position as an opposition party' .21 Thus 
the JSP-Komeito-DSP line-up for a coalition government did 
not look promising as a result of their disparate 
characters and policies. 
Changes in the JSP's defence policy 
Despite the hesitation of the JSP to adopt 
more "realistic" policies, certain policy changes were 
attempted in the 1980's. These changes were made to 
lmpress the electorate and the centrist parties that the 
JSP was a "realistic" and a "responsible" party. In 
foreign policy, the JSP tried to portray itself as no 
longer hostile to the US. 22 It also broke the taboo of 
limiting its contacts with North Korea but not with South 
20. Yomiuri, March I, 1982. 
21. Asahi, January 15, 1982. 
22. A "Council to Consider Japan-US Relations" was set up 
by the JSP in 1982. See Yomiuri, Evening, April 26, 
1984. The Japan-US Exchange Committee was also 
established in 1984. See Nihon Keizai, April 15, 
1984. Ishibashi went to the US in April 1984. See 
Nihon Keizai, April 13, 1984. A branch bureau of 
the party's organ paper Shakai Shimpo was also opened 
in Washington. See Asahi, July 8, 1984 . 
IL 
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Korea 23 
. The party also attempted a facelift by selling 
itself as the "New JSP" in 1983. Some JSP Dietmen also 
challenged the party's rejection of atomic power for 
Japan. 24 In January 1986, the JSP officially discarded 
Marxism and adopted social democracy as its ideology. 
Amidst all these policy changes, defence policy has proven 
to be the most intractable to change. Where changes to 
the party's defence policy did occur, they were rather 
incremental and limited in scope. 
The Diet Special Committee on Security 
In 1980, a Special Committee on Security was 
established in each House of the Diet. The Special 
Committee on Security even includes representatives from 
the JSP and the JCP. The Special Committee on Security 
lS, at present, not empowered to take up leg i slat i ve 
measures. Thus it is not in a position to affect defence 
policy already decided. The Committee is said to have 
"the potential to affect future defence policy ... Still 
it is too early to tell whether it will be effective 
or merely at best a talking-shop or, at worst, an 
institutionalised arena for ritual combat between the 
23. The Japan Times Weekly, June 8, 1985. However, the 
JSP's contacts in South Korea are limited to the 
South Korean opposition party, the New Korea 
Democratic Party. 
24. The Japan Times Weekly, June 22, 1985. 
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government and the opposition on defence.,,25 
The Special Committees on Security were not 
set up before 1980 as there was no inter-party consensus 
for their establishment. Yet, it should not be assumed 
that the setting up of this committee indicates an 
emerglng consensus on defence. From the JSP's viewpoint, 
it is another means to strengthen civilian control of 
defence policy. The JSP considers the Committee to be a 
forum to highlight the differences between the JSP and the 
LDP's defence policy.26 Many JSP members do not attach 
h . h" 27 muc lmportance to t lS commlttee. The consent of the 
JSP to the establishment of the Special Committees on 
Security is not a departure from the JSP's defence policy. 
Back in 1965, Ishibashi had already recommended the 
establishment of a Committee on Defence in the Diet to 
strengthen civilian control. 28 
25. J.W. Chapman, R. Drifte, I.T.M. Gow, OPe cit., p.49. 
26. Interview with Vice Secretary General Yogi Soga on 
March 3, 1986. 
27. Interviews with various party officials revealed 
that the party attaches much greater importance to 
the Diet's Budget Committee and the Cabinet Affairs 
Committee for discussion on defence issues. 
28. Japan Socialist Review, No. 109, May 1, 1966, p.20. 
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Budget allocation for defence 
Prior to 1983, the JSP had adopted a policy of 
reducing the military budget. By the budget compilation 
of 1983, it had switched to a policy of "freezing" rather 
than "reducing" the defence budget. 29 Thus the JSP 
tacitly accepted the status quo of 1% GNP ceiling on 
defence spending rather than its reduction. The Japan 
Defence Agency (JDA), not surprisingly, was gratified by 
the JSP's new position. 30 It thanked the JSP for not 
demanding the reduction of its defence expenditure. 
However, the DSP criticized the JSP's decision to "freeze" 
the defence budget as not going far enough. The JSP's 
new position on the defence budget is considered by the 
DSP to be an "irresponsible" policy.31 Despite the 
readjustment by the JSP to its policy on defence spending, 
it is possible that a gap between the JSP's policy and the 
actual defence spending of Japan might emerge from 1987 
onwards. It is likely that defence spending in 1987 
might exceed the 1% GNP ceiling. 32 
29. Nihon Keizai, January 29, 1984. 
30. Tokyo Shimbun, Evening, February 3, 1984. 
31. Nihon Keizai, January 29, 1984. 
32. See Seikoken Repoto, No. 44, November 1985, 
pp. 2-7. 
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The SDF as lIunconstitutional but legal ll proposal 
One important attempt to change the party's 
position towards the SDF was the "unconstitutional but 
legal ll controversy. It failed to be officially adopted 
by the JSP as a result of the strong resistance from the 
left factions of the party. However this attempt at 
change should not be dismissed as insignificant even 
though its objectives have not yet been fulfilled. The 
JDA Director General publicly expressed his appreciation 
to the JSP's IIrealistic linell for accepting the legality 
33 
of the SDF. The legitimacy of the SDF has always been 
In question as a result of Article 9. Its ambiguous 
constitutional status has affected the morale and the 
recruitment of the armed forces. 34 The JSP has been 
responsible, to a large extent, for casting a cloud over 
the legitimacy of the SDF through a strict interpretation 
of Article 9. Thus, the JSP's attempt to recognise the 
legality, if not the constitutionality of the SDF, is 
obviously welcomed by the armed forces. 35 
33. Tokyo Shimbun, Evening, February 3, 1984. 
34. J.W.M. Chapman, R. Drifte, I.T.M. Gow, op. cit., 
p.23. 
35. That the SDF was considered legal by the JSP was 
regarded by the JDA as a significant date in the 
domestic calendar of defence policy changes. See 
Japan Defence Agency, Defence White Paper 1985 
translated by The Japan Times Ltd, p.331. 
The JSP's defence policy, change and the consequence 
for "coalition politics" 
Is the JSP's defence policy really a serlOUS 
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stumbling block to a coalition with the centrist parties? 
By early 1980, all three parties had hastily patched 
together two contradictory agreements: the Komeito-JSP 
pact and the Komeito-DSP agreement. Tempted by the 
possibility of forming a government, the differences 
between the three parties were conveniently side-stepped. 
It was pointed out that "despite the differences in their 
ways of thinking about the nation's basic policies 
(Security Treaty and defence), the three opposition 
parties compromised and completed these two coalition 
plans for the sole purpose of setting up an opposition 
administration as soon as possible".36 
In 1984, both DSP and Komeito sought to take 
advantage of the LDP's factional infighting by supporting 
Susumu Nikaido (Tanaka faction) as the LDP's party 
'd 37 preSl ent. They hoped to form a coalition with at 
least a segment of the LDP. In 1985, Komeito was 
prepared to participate in any "anti-Nakasone" LDP 
government at "any time".38 Thus Komeito showed itself 
36. The Japan Times Weekly, October 3, 1981. 
37. Nihon Keizai, December 6, 
Weekly, January 26, 1985; 
April 13, 1985. 
38. Asahi, October 21, 1985. 
1984; The Japan Times 
The Japan Times Weekly, 
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willing to participate in a coalition with the LDP despite 
the differences over defence. 
Ishibashi has also rationalised the possibility 
of forming a coalition even with the LDP in spite of the 
JSP's disapproval of the LDP's defence policy. Ishibashi 
claimed that" there is a sense of weariness even 
within the ruling party against (Nakasone's militaristic) 
statements. If he continues in the present direction, 
there is a possibility of even closer links between 
members of the ruling and opposition parties in the 
future" 3 9 . By the end of 1985, Ishibashi declared that 
"there will be a possibility that the LDP will split, if 
we are able to decrease the number of its seats to half of 
the total or less, and that we should then give thought to 
f ' 1'" h ' " 40 ormlng a coa ltlon Wlt It. 
In the same month, the JSP's draft of the New 
Declaration stated that the JSP will "face political power 
relations with any political parties in a positive way".41 
Subsequently, the draft was - revised because of strong 
opposition from the left. The final draft proposed that 
the JSP should seek the replacement of the LDP as the 
39. Mas~i Ishibashi, "The Prospects of Politics in 1983 
: A View of the Japan Socialist Party", IPSJ Papers, 
No. 36, Tokyo: 1983, p.5. 
40. Asahi, December 22, 1985. 
41. Nihon Keizai, December 20, 1985. 
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. 42 party In power. Thus, it showed that the right 
factions contemplate a coalition even with the LDP. If 
the right factions could continue their ascendency over 
the left factions, they would be in a better position to 
push for a coalition even with the LDP. However, it was 
left unclear how a coalition with the LDP could be 
reconciled with the party principle of unarmed neutrality. 
Even if the JSP were to shift to a more positive 
attitude towards the Security Treaty, it would not be a 
sufficient condition to secure the acceptance of the party 
by the 'DSP. The DSP is interested not only in the policy 
changes of the JSP but also in changes to the JSP's 
personnel. 43 The DSP is still extremely suspicious of 
the left factions within the JSP. The DSP would be more 
amenable to a coalition with the right factions of the 
party, or with a JSP where the left is no longer 
influential, or a JSP with the left excluded from the 
party. 
In January 1986, the DSP criticized the JSP's 
New Declaration for not discarding the policy of unarmed 
neutrality. The DSP has continued to insist that "there 
can be no coalition with the JSP, unless it changes its 
attitude of 'unarmed neutrality' and opposition to the 
42. ibid. 
43. Asahi, Evening, January 23, 1986. 
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Japan-US Security Treaty ... 44 An advantage obtained by 
the DSP leadership by criticizing the JSP's defence policy 
as "unrealistic" is that it serves as a useful excuse to 
avoid committing itself to a coalition arrangement with 
the JSP and to keep its preferred coalition option with 
the LDP. The left wing members of the DSP want to form a 
coalition with the other opposition parties (except the 
JCP ) in order to replace the LDP government. In contrast, 
the DSP's party elders prefer a coalition with the LDP. 
Thus, the party elders find it convenient to point out to 
the party's rank and file that major policy differences 
between the DSP and JSP make a coalition arrangement 
between the two parties difficult. 45 By emphasising the 
differences in the defence policies of the two parties, 
the DSP can rationalise to the party members the i r 
preference for a coalition with the LDP . 
Even if the JSP were to attempt further changes 
In its defence policy, it is less attractive to the DSP 
and Komeito as a coalition partner. The likelihood of 
galnlng power lS far better through a coalition with the 
LDP than with the JSP. A JSP-Komeito-DSP coalition lS 
not yet in a position to muster sufficient numbers to form 
a coalition government, as shown in the following 
44 . . Sankei, January 29, 1986. 
45. The Japan Times Weekly, May 11, 1985. 
I! f . 46 19ures: 
Distribution of Diet Seats In 
House of Representatives Elections 
Parties 
1976 1980 
LDP 249 284 
New Liberal Club 
JSP-DSP-Komeito 207 172 
All Opposition 241 216 
Total Seats 511 511 
1983 
250 
8 
258 
208 
237 
511 
The centrist parties are unwilling to align 
themselves with the JCP as part of an all opposition 
strategy. The DSP stated that "even if the opposition 
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parties were to obtain a majority in the general election, 
we will not be able to secure a majority unless we have 
the JCP, which is a political party with a different 
quality, ]Oln us. We cannot but approve a government 
47 
centred on the LDP". 
The Socialist Association pointed out that there 
are only two plausible coalition strategies that could 
possibly muster the numbers to form the government. They 
are either a JSP-Komeito-DSP-LDP lineup or an all 
46. Figures from Japan Statistical Yearbooks in Bradley, 
M. Richardson/Scott C. Flanagan, Politics: Japan 
(Little, Brown and Co., Boston: 1984), p.78. 
47. Yomiuri, March 23, 1984. 
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opposition parties strategy. The Socialist Association's 
conclusion is that a coalition with the LDP is an anathema 
and that a JSP-Komeito-DSP lineup which excludes the JCP 
would not have the numbers to form a coalition government. 
Therefore the JSP should not be preoccupied with the quest 
for a coalition government but should concentrate on 
"struggles" against the LDP. 48 The right factions drew a 
different conclusion: it is necessary to be prepared to 
form a coalition even with a segment of the LDP in the event 
of a split within the ruling party. 
Even if the JSP were to adopt a more "realistic" 
defence policy, there is no assurance that it will be able 
to secure a place in a coalition comprising the LDP, 
Komeito and the DSP. "Coalition politics" does not hinge 
on the defence issue alone. However, if future elections 
see the LDP losing its majority (even when aligned with 
the New Liberal Club), coalition manoeuvres will be fluid. 
The key consideration would be the coalition line-up which 
could facilitate the attainment of power, rather than a 
preoccupation with the defence policies of the prospective 
coalition partners. Thus the parties have behaved in 
contradictory ways. On certain occasions, they attach 
importance to defence policy as the crucial criteria for 
a party's suitability to be a coalition partner. In 
practice, opportunism prevails. It is conceivable that 
48. Asahi, January 27, 1980. 
differences over defence could be conveniently papered 
over In the pursuit of a coalition path to power. 
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Even though no parties (with the exception of 
the JSP) subscribe to the ideal of unarmed neutrality, the 
opportunism of coalition politics might lead other parties 
to find the JSP's present defence policy to be tolerable 
enough. That policy presents no demand for the reduction 
of the defence budget; an effort to recognise the 
legality of the SDF; and the tacit acceptance of the 
Security Treaty "for the time being" without a declared 
timetable for abrogation. An expedient toleration of the 
JSP's defence policy is not impossible given the wider 
consideration of a coalition government. Likewise, the 
JSP leadership is even prepared to form a coalition with a 
segment of the LDP despite the differences in their 
defence policies. 
Jj' 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LABOUR UNIONS, THE JSP AND DEFENCE 
In this chapter, the following questions will be 
considered: 
(i) What is the relationship between Sohyo and 
the JSP? 
(ii) Why has Sohyo shifted away from radicalism? 
(iii) What is Sohyo's defence policy? 
(iv) What is the impact of labour unions on the 
JSP's defence policy? 
The symbiotic relationship between the JSP and Sohyo 
Sohyo is Japan's largest trade union federation 
with a 4 .5 million membership. It provides organi-
sational,l electoral and financial support to the JSP . 
Sohyo is the JSP's primary pressure group. As a result 
of the party's dependence on Sohyo, it is amenable to 
Sohyo's policy inputs which are not restricted to socio-
economic issues but include foreign policy and defence 
proposals as well. The relationship between the JSP and 
Sohyo is also cemented by personal ties. 62% of the 
1. Sohyo's formal organisational support includes a 
nationwide network of Councils of JSP members of 
Sohyo which was established in 1961; a Committee for 
Strengthening the JSP was established by Sohyo-
affiliated unions in 1980. See Asahi, September 28, 
1975; Ninon Keizai, November 3, 1980. 
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incumbent Lower House and 67% of the Upper House JSP Diet-
b f d . .. 2 mem ers are 0 tra e unlon orlglns. 
While Sohyo is the primary trade unlon 
federation supporting the JSP, the party also enjoys 
some support from Churitsuroren (Federation of Independent 
Unions) and Shinsambetsu (National Federation of 
Industrialorganisations).3 
Sohyo, since 1979, has not given support only to 
the JSP. As the Sohyo leadership favours a JSP-Komeito-
DSP coalition government, it has also e x tended some 
support to Komeito's candidates too. 4 Since Sohyo 
comprises 18 public se~tor union federations and 32 
private sector union federations, it is not a monolithic 
. t . 5 organlsa lone 
of policy goals, 
While Sohyo's leadership may pursue a set 
its affiliated unions may also pursue 
their own independent policy goals inclusive of defence 
pOlicy. 
While Sohyo does not officially discriminate 
against any particular JSP factions, certain Sohyo-
affiliated unions only extend selective support towards 
2. Asahi, October 27, 1985. 
3. Churitsu Roren's mainstay member union, Denki Roren 
(All Japan Federation of Electric Machine Workers 
Union) also acts as a pressure group to push the JSP 
to adopt more "realistic" policies. Sankei, July 19, 
1985. On Churitsuroren and Shinsambetsu's support 
for the JSP, see Nihon Keizai, November 3, 1980. 
4. Nihon Keizai, Evening, September 14, 1979. 
5. Sohyo, This is Sohyo : Japanese Workers and Their 
Struggle (Sohyo, Tokyo: 1985), pp.118-127. 
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specific JSP factions. For example, Zendentsu (Japan 
Telecommunications Workers' Union), Tekko Roren (National 
Federation of Iron and Steel Workers Union) and Zensei 
(Japan Postal Workers Union) support the JSP right 
factions while denying electoral support to the Socialist 
A . t' 6 SSOCla lone The extreme left faction, Socialist 
Association, receives support from elements within 
Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers Union), Kokuro (National Railway 
Workers Union) and Jichiro (All-Japan Prefectural and 
Municipal Workers Union).7 
The JSP, as a result of its dependence on Sohyo, 
has been labelled the "political bureau of Sohyo.,,8 
Moreover, Sohyo has often intervened in party affairs. 
Sohyo claimed that "it is difficult to fix the limit on 
such intervention. However, if it is entrusted to the 
party alone, then nothing can be done. The present 
situation in the JSP is such that even if we are not asked 
to step in, we cannot but step in ... If the JSP does not 
accept what (Sohyo) says, then we will change our stand of 
supporting the JSP alone.,,9 
6. Yomiuri, August 20, 1977; Yomiuri, Evening, July 5, 
1978; Mainichi, September 14, 1979. 
7. Interview on February 19, 1986 with Mr. Yoichi Yamada u 
Director of International Bureau, Sohyo. 
8. Nihon Keizai, May 23, 1979. 
9. This statement was made by Sohyo's Secretary General 
Mitsuo Tomizuka when Sohyo intervened against the 
Socialist Association in 1977. Such an attitude by 
Sohyo was also exhibited in its subsequent 
interventions when the party has been immobilised by 
factional fighting. See Tokyo Shimbun, July 20, 1977. 
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Nevertheless Sohyo has continued to support the 
JSP. The official reason why the JSP has been supported 
by Sohyo is because the JSP is the preferential party of 
. b 10 lts mem ers. Even though there has been declining 
support for the JSP especially among younger workers, the 
JSP is still supported by the majority of younger workers 
11 
who have party preferences. The main reason for 
Sohyo's support of the JSP is because the party represents 
the interests of Sohyo through the parliamentary process. 
By supporting the JSP, the party is able to deny the LDP 
the opportunity to revise the Constitution and dilute 
post-war reforms that have included labour r i ghts. Thus 
both the JSP and Sohyo need each other. 
Yet, mutual dependence also has its drawbacks. 
One reason for the JSP's electoral decline is its image of 
representing the narrow, sectoral interests of its trade 
union supporters. The long term decline of the JSP has 
been alarming to Sohyo because if the trend were to 
continue, its ally would be less able to represent its 
interests from within the Diet. Ishibashi sums up the 
symbiotic relationship well: "In this alliance, we share 
10. Interview with Mr. Yoichi Yamada. 
11. In a poll conducted by Sohyo on its younger members 
from 29 major member unions aged 31 and below, 45.6% 
did not support any particular political party. For 
those who did support a party, the majority preference 
is still the JSP. The support pattern is as follows: 
JSP:36%; LDP:8.1%; JCP:4%; Komeito:1.8%; DSP:0.8%. 
The Japan Times, February 19, 1986. 
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each other's fortunes; we look at ourselves through our 
partner's eyes. If Sohyo declines, we decline; and vice 
versa" 12 
In the hope of arresting the decline of the 
IIJSP-Sohyo bloc", Sohyo has adopted more "realistic 
policies" . It has in turn pressured the JSP to pursue 
more "realistic policies" inclusive of defence. In order 
to understand why Sohyo's rightward trend has had a ripple 
effect on the JSP's defence policy, it is pertinent to 
know, in brief, why Sohyo has shifted away from Marxist 
militancy to a position that exercises a moderating 
influence on the JSP . 
Sohyo The shift from radicalism 
Even today, Sohyo believes that II given the 
reactionary nature of the Japanese employers and the 
conservative government, trade unions should act 
vigorously in the political arena if only to defend the 
economlC life of workers".13 
Although Sohyo's activism still extends beyond 
the economic realm, it has become less militant for a 
14 
number of reasons. By the 1970's, Sohyo's new 
12. Ishibashi Mas~i, Unarmed Neutrality 
Peace, OPe cit., p.100. 
13. Sohyo, OPe cit., p.45. 
A Path To World 
14. For a succinct summary of the reasons for Sohyo's 
militancy, see Bradley M. Richardson and Scott C. 
Flanagan, OPe cit., pp.81-84. See also 
Stockwin, OPe cit., p.92. 
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leadership had become less radical. 15 The automatic 
extension of the Security Treaty, the American withdrawal 
from Vietnam v and the reversion of Okinawa to Japan removed 
some of the grounds for radicalism. Increasing 
affluence, and an occupational structure shifting to white 
collar employment, have made Marxism less attractive to 
16 
workers. Sohyo has a new set of problems and has 
become relatively less preoccupied with foreign policy and 
defence issues. The relative slowdown of Japan's 
economic growth has also made it difficult for Sohyo to 
secure substantial annual wage hikes for its workers. 
Sohyo has also identified a number of problem areas caused 
by Japan's structural transformation in the 1980's. 
These are: the problems of middle and old-aged workers; 
the problems of unemployment that would be aggravated by 
robotization and office automation; the influx of women 
15. Sohyo was led for the larger part of the 1950's and 
1960's by Chairman Ota Kaoru (1955-67) and General 
Secretary IwaiAkira (1955-68), both of whom 
subscribed to Marxism. See Cole, Totten and Uyehara 
OPe cit., p.341. Sohyo leaders also accepted 
Professor Sakisaka's revolutionary thesis that workers 
must be prepared to use force, if necessary, to seize 
power from the capitalists. See Stockwin, ibid., 
p.92. Mr. Yoichi Yamada bel i eved that the shift of 
Sohyo away from militancy is not mer ely a result of 
the different personalities of Sohyo's new leadership. 
According to Mr. Yamada a new environment faced by 
Sohyo called for a new type of leaders and new leaders 
did appear. Thus Sohyo's radical leaders were phased 
out. 
16. Robert E. Cole, Japanese Blue Collar: The Changing 
Tradition (University of California Press, Berkeley: 
1971), p.270. 
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workers into the economy; and the need to rectify Sohyo's 
failure to organise workers in the growing tertiary sector 
17 
of the economy. Moreover, the existence of Sohyo is 
threatened by the proposal to establish a national unified 
labour front, Zenminrokyo (The National Council of Private 
Enterprise Workers Unions). If Sohyo's private unions 
were to join Zenminrokyo, there is the danger that Sohyo 
would split and be weakened. Faced with a new set of 
problems and a threat to its survival, Sohyo has responded 
with more "pragmatic" policies. This "realism" has also 
been extended to Sohyo's defence policy. 
Sohyo's defence policy 
In 1951, at the Second Congress of Sohyo, the 
left wing unions of Sohyo mustered enough strength to 
incorporate the Four Peace Principles into its political 
18 programme. 
peace treaty; 
They are: the settlement of a universal 
the neutrality of Japan; and the rejection of 
all military bases and the refusal to rearm. The policy 
of "unarmed neutrality" was disagreeable to Sodomei, the 
right-wing trade union federation then affiliated with 
Sohyo and also to Zenro, the breakaway federation from 
17. Sohyo, op. cit., pp.70-75. 
18. Hubert Brochier, liThe Great Trade Union Confederations 
: Sohyo and Domei" in Livingston, Moore and Oldfather 
(ed.), Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present (Pantheon 
Books, New York: 1973), p.449. 
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., d t d " 19 Sohyo comprlslng mo era e an conservatlve unlons. 
Zenro and Sodomei, opposed to Sohyo's radicalism, formed a 
rival trade union federation, Domei (Japanese Workers 
Confederation) in November 1964. Subsequently, Domei has 
extended its support to DSP, a party which has always 
rejected the policy of unarmed neutrality. 
Sohyo, in the early days, was responsible for 
pushing the JSP's defence policy to the left. After the 
party schism of 1951, Sohyo extended its support primarily 
to the Left JSP. It was noted that: "the Left 
Socialists at first tempered their policies, calling for a 
revlslon of the peace treaty and abrogation of the 
security pact; but supporting unions obliged these 
leaders to adopt a stronger stand against the two treaties 
and to champion the four principles of peace".20 
In the 1960's, Sohyo was in the vanguard of the 
mass movements against the revision of the Japan-US 
Security Treaty, US involvement in Vietnam and the US 
occupation of Okinawa. Even in the early 1970's, Sohyo's 
defence policy seemed to be more radical than the JSP's 
official defence policy. Sohyo advocated the abrogation 
of the Security Treaty as soon as possible. 21 JSP's 
defence policy at that time was more ambiguous on the 
timing of the treaty's abrogation. By the late 1970's, 
19. ibid., p. 451 ; See also Stockwin, Ope cit., pp.40-48. 
20. Cole, Totten and Uyehara, Ope cit., p.37. 
21. Yomiuri, Evening, February 21, 1973. 
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Sohyo's general orientation was to move away from the 
left. While it had once supported the defence policy of 
JSP's left, Sohyo has changed its position to one of 
support for the defence policy of the JSP's right. 
Sohyo's world Vlew 
Sohyo has shifted from Marxism to social 
democracy. It had previously declined to join the non-
communist ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions) . Until the mid 1970's, Sohyo had been closer to 
the eastern bloc even though it was supposed to maintain 
the policy of "positive neutrality". Conversely, it was 
hostile to the US. 
In the mid 1970's, Sohyo launched its "la bour 
diplomacy" towards the west. Sohyo had a rapprochement 
with its American counterpart, AFL-CIO (American 
Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial 
O . t . ) 22 rganlsa lon . Both trade union federations broke off 
relations in 1965 because of security-related lssues. 
Sohyo had accused the US of being imperialist aggressors 
in Vietnam. AFL-CIO, which was staunchly anti-communist, 
saw Hanoi as the aggressor. It was also hostile towards 
Sohyo because AFL-CIO perceived Sohyo to be a pro-
communist organisation which opposed the Japan-US Security 
23 Treaty. 
22. Mainichi, Evening, August 3, 1976; 
October 3, 1978. 
23. ibid. 
Yomiuri, Evening, 
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Sohyo's shift towards the West was also prompted 
. . t t' . . h 24 by the fear of lncreaslng pro ec lonlsm ln t e West. 
Sohyo's worry was that trade restrictions would be 
detrimental to the livelihood of its workers. Moreover, 
Sohyo was concerned that the trade union federations in the 
West would support protectionism. Thus, it was hoped that 
Sohyo's reorientation towards the West would open channels 
of communication and understanding with the trade unlon 
federations of the West. Sohyo's labour d i p l omacy was, 
interestingly, supported by the Ministry of Labour and the 
. .. 25 Forelgn Mlnlstry. 
Sohyo also exchanged relations with the General 
Confederation of Labour (West Germany), the Trade Union 
Congress (Britain); applied to join the OECD's Trade Union 
Advisory Committee and established an office in Paris, the 
26 OECD headquarters. 
While Sohyo has moved towards the West, its 
relations with the USSR have been more restrained. Sohyo, 
to the annoyance of the Soviets, held a rally for the first 
time in 1978, demanding the return of all the Kurile 
27 Islands. It also supports the Polish trade union 
2 4 . Mainichi, March 13, 1978. 
25. Ibid. See also Asahi, February 18, 1978 and Weekly 
Labour News, January 23, 1978. 
26. Mainichi, October 6, 1978; Yomiuri, October 21, 1978. 
27. ibid., Yomiuri. 
I f;, 
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Solidarity's struggle for autonomy.28 Sohyo also 
suspended an exchange with the USSR for some time in 
protest dt the Soviet shooting of the Korean Airliner in 
1983. 29 Thus, by the 1980's, Sohyo had weaned itself away 
from the Socialist bloc and changed its hostile outlook 
towards the US as a result of ideological reorientation, 
pragmatism and its general shift away from the left. 
Sohyo's threat perception 
Sohyo perceives that the real threat to Japan lS 
the danger of Japanese militarism. Sohyo's hostility 
toward any revival of militarism has its roots in the 
labour movement's history of repression by Japan's pre-war 
militaristic regime. To Sohyo, militarism is the 
antithesis of peace and democracy. It believes that 
"democracy is a necessary prerequisite for the defence of 
peace and the protection of the living of workers".30 
Sohyo disagrees that the USSR is a threat to Japan. It 
supports the view that the creation of tension between the 
USSR and Japan is the danger and not the USSR itself. 31 
28. Sohyo, OPe cit., p.80. 
29. Mainichi, September 10, 1983. 
30. Sohyo, OPe cit., p.S2. 
31. Kyodo Desk, No.2, October 1, 1983, p.S. This 
periodical is published by Sohyo's Association for 
Supporting and Strengthening the JSP. 
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Sohyo's view of the alliance 
Sohyo had once vehemently opposed the Security 
Treaty. It led the massive demonstrations against the 
revlslon of the Security treaty in 1960. While Sohyo 
still advocates the abrogation of the Security Treaty, it 
no longer calls for the speedy abrogation of the Treaty. 
While the Sohyo leadership has tacitly accepted the 
Security Treaty for the time being, some of its affiliated 
unions have divergent views on the Security Treaty. For 
instance, Tekko Roren (Japan Federation of Iron and Steel 
Workers Union) on the right, supports the maintenance of the 
Security Treaty, the right of self-defence and has rejected 
d I , I' . 32 unarme neutra lty as unrea lStlC. Goka Roren 
(Federation of Synthetic Chemical Workers Union), on the 
left, calls for the abrogation of the Security Treaty as a 
33 
maJor task for "struggle". Thus the Sohyo leadership ln 
its consideration of defence policy has to take into 
account the differing views of its affiliated unions and 
where the centre of gravity lies along the ideological 
spectrum of its member unions. 
Sohyo's view: Constitutional and legal framework 
for defence 
Sohyo opposes the revision of Article 9. Such a 
position also has the added advantage of preventing the LDP 
32. Mainichi, March 15, 1969; 
1982. 
Tokyo Shimbun, July 29, 
33. Tokyo Shimbun, August 25, 1982. 
III 
from revising the labour rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution. This is because if the LDP succeeds 1n 
revising Article 9, it may open the floodgates of revision 
resulting in the loss of constitutionally guaranteed labour 
rights. Sohyo has always suspected that an LDP government 
would collude with big business to introduce anti-labour 
measures. 
Sohyo does not object to Ishibashi's position 
that the SDF is unconstitutional but legal. 
Sohyo's view: The appropriate military force and posture 
Sohyo has adopted the operational policy of armed 
neutrality while retaining the declaratory policy of 
unarmed neutrality. Sohyo's position in the 1980's 1S 
that: lIit is impossible to realize, at one stroke, the 
ideal of unarmed neutrality, including the i mmediate 
dissolution of the SDF and the immediate abrogation of the 
Security Treaty ll.34 Sohyo envisages a three stage process 
towards the ideal of unarmed neutrality.3S At the first 
stage, a JSP-led coalition government would still stay 
within the alliance. At the second stage, the coalition 
government would abolish the Security Treaty and declare 
Japan's neutrality. At the third stage, the SDF would be 
gradually reduced in accordance with Ishibashi's Four 
34. Nihon Keizai, Evening, December 1, 1980. 
35. Kyodo Desk, No.6, November 18, 1983, p.S. 
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Conditions. The declaratory goal is to "ultimately 
realise unarmed neutrality and external peace in the 
world" 36 . Armed neutrality is not stated explicitly as 
Sohyo's preferable defence policy. Such a policy, 
however, is implied as the SDF is not to be abolished when 
Japan leaves the alliance. This position is similar to 
Ishibashi's operational policy of armed neutrality for 
Japan. 
The labour unions' impact on JSP's defence policy 
In October 1979, the JSP and Sohyo made a pact 
that the JSP should reorientate itself towards social 
democracy; to exclude the JCP from a coalition framework; 
and to form a coalition with Komeito and to review its 
policy on the Security Treaty.37 By nudging the JSP 
towards support for a coalition with the two centrist 
parties, Sohyo has also tacitly accepted that the JSP 
should narrow the defence policy gap between the JSP and 
the centrist parties. 
Sohyo has kept up the pressure on the JSP to 
adopt more "realistic" policies. It asserted that 
"concerning various problems, including defence, foreign 
policy, nuclear-power generation, administrative reform, 
etc., the JSP has come to disclose its weak points, to the 
effect that it cannot announce ideas as a political party 
36. ibid. 
37. Tokyo Shimbun, October 15, 1979. 
~;. 
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or realistic policies. Also, it lacks efforts to overcome 
that ... 
,,38 
the JSP ... should announce new policy goals 
Sohyo's affiliated union, Zentai, insisted that 
In order to establish a JSP-Ied coalition government, "the 
JSP must establish a realistic policy line in the fields of 
diplomatic, security and energy policies. 
the SDF, unarmed neutrality is an ideal. 
With regard to 
(However) we 
should not mix it with reality".39 Another Sohyo's 
affiliated union, Zendentsu, also believed that "it is 
difficult to form a coalition without a policy-based 
agreement. The JSP will have to give its answer in 
concrete terms about the Security Treaty, the SDF, atomic 
power generation and the ROK. Otherwise i t will probably 
be difficult to obtain the people's understanding and 
support as a responsible political part y ll. 4 0 Given the 
JSP's dependence on the trade unions, the party is 
susceptible to their pressure to review its defence policy. 
As a result of the convergence between Sohyo, its right-
wlng affiliated unions and the JSP's centre and right 
factions on defence, the JSP's defence policy has shifted, 
in a limited way, to the right. One reason why the JSP 
has made only limited changes to i ts defence policy is 
because there has been no real pressure from Sohyo on the 
38. Mainichi, November 14, 1981. 
39. Asahi, October 29, 1985. 
40. Mainichi, February 16, 1986. 
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JSP to make more than limited changes. This is because 
Sohyo's defence policy is fairly similar to the JSP's 
defence policy. Sohyo has not demanded publicly that the 
JSP should show a more positive attitude towards the 
Security Treaty even if it is to be maintained for the time 
being. 
However, the right-wing Sohyo-affiliated trade 
unlons would probably appreciate a JSP that accepts the 
Security Treaty more explicitly and positively "for the 
time being", while retaining its option of armed 
neutrality and declaratory ideal of unarmed neutrality. 
Besides direct pressure from the labour unions on 
the JSP to change its defence policy, other actions by the 
labour unions have indirectly affected the JSP's defence 
policy. The support of Sohyo for the r ight and centre 
factions had a decisive impact on the decl i ne of the left 
factions. Since the left factions have been weakened, in 
part, by the repeated intervention of Sohyo against them, 
the shift of the balance of power towards the right 
factions has also meant that the left has been less able to 
pursue their preferable defence policy. 
In July 1977, Sohyo intervened in the party's 
factional struggle and forced the Soc ialist Association to 
limit itself to just a theoretical group to study 
. 41 Marxlsm. It also proposed the change in the composition 
of the delegates at the important annual party convention. 
41. Asahi, July 30, 1977. 
r 
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Sohyo successfully sponsored the automatic right of 
Dietmembers to vote at the convention. This was a blow 
to the Socialist Association because it had few 
Dietmembers in its ranks. From then on, the power of the 
Socialist Association has waned. Denki Roren and 
Zendentsu have also refused to support candidates from the 
, I' ," 1 t' 42 SOCla lSt Assoclatlon In e ec lons. 
In February 1982, Sohyo boycotted the JSP left 
Asukata-Baba leadership by castigating it as a "one-lung" 
executive which excludes the right factions. 43 Asukata 
had to give in to Sohyo's pressure. In subsequent party 
elections, the right factions have continued their 
ascendency over the left factions. In January 1986, the 
centre and right factions, with Sohyo's backing, succeeded 
in adopting the New Declaration as the party's ideology.44 
All these interventions by Sohyo have contributed to the 
decline of the left factions. 
As a result of Sohyo's rightward shift and its 
switch of support away from the left factions, it has given 
impetus to the JSP leadership to move towards the right too. 
The changes to the JSP's defence policy was, in part, a 
42. Yomiuri, August 20 
July 5 ,1978. 
, 1977; Yomiuri, Evening, 
43. See Yomiuri, February 7, 1982; Asahi, Evening, 
February 17, 1982; Asahi, February 18, 1982; 
Nihon Keizai, Evening, March 1, 1982; Yomiuri, April 
13, 1982. 
44. Sankei, January 9, 1986. 
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consequence of Sohyo's movement towards the right, its 
subsequent support to the centre and right factions of the 
JSP, and its direct pressure on the JSP to be "more 
realistic" on defence. 
! 
:'IJ ___ _ 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
The final chapter will ask the following 
questions: 
(i) What are the conceivable changes to the JSP's 
defence policy? 
(ii) Does the JSP have the capacity to change its 
defence policy? 
117 
(iii) The thesis will conclude by canvassing the 
merits and the possible problems of armed 
neutrality as the JSP's official defence policy. 
The possible changes in the JSP's defence policy 
They are: 
(i) to regard to SDF as "unconstitutional but 
legal II • 
(ii) to recognise the SDF as "constitutional and 
legal II • 
(iii) a more "positive" acceptance of the Security 
Treaty "for the time being", without discarding 
the declaratory ideal of unarmed neutrality. 
(iv) to explicitly adopt armed neutrality as the 
party's operational and declaratory policy while 
retaining "unarmed neutrality II as a distant 
ideal. 
Ill'. 4M 
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The party's capacity to change its defence policy 
The JSP's capacity to change its defence policy 
will depend on how far-ranging the proposed changes are. 
Even though JSP supporters have increasingly grown to 
accept the Security Treaty and the SDF,l the party has 
retained its declaratory policy of unarmed neutrality. 
Despite the sustained pressure on the JSP by the centrist 
parties to discard its "unarmed neutrality" policy, the 
JSP has refrained from doing so. The left factions would 
resist any moves to drop the party's hallmark of "unarmed 
neutrality" . Even the right factions are reluctant to do 
so because of their pacifist leanings. Maruyama and some 
other JSP secretaries who reject the "unarmed neutrality" 
policy are an isolated minority within the party. Sohyo, 
which maintains the declaratory policy of "unarmed 
neutrality" would veto any attempts to discard the policy 
of unarmed neutrality. 
Efforts to adopt the SDF as "constitutional and 
legal" would also meet the same fate, in the foreseeable 
future, for the same reasons. However, it is only a 
matter of time before Seikoken, Shaken and the Katsumata 
faction move again to adopt the SDF as "unconstitutional 
but legal" because of the decline of the Socialist 
Association and the disunity of the New Birth Research 
Council. 
1. Yomiuri, June 8, 1980. 
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Is it possible for the JSP to adopt a more 
"positive" attitude toward the Security Treaty while 
retaining its ideal of unarmed neutrality? If Seikoken 
continues to increase its factional power, it could, In 
alignment with Shaken, support such a position especially 
if it could enhance the party's prospects for a coalition 
with the centrist parties. Since both Seikoken and 
Shaken are not hostile to the US, it is easier for them to 
adopt a more "positive" attitude towards the alliance. 
However, the pro Soviet factions (the Katsumata faction 
and the Socialist Association) and the pro North Korea 
faction (New Birth Research Council) would be reluctant to 
adopt a similar position. 
What might possibly change a factional stalemate 
to a more "positive" acceptance of the Security Treaty is 
intervention from Sohyo. Sohyo has continued shifting 
toward the right since the 1970's. It has also discarded 
its hostility toward the US. If Sohyo is convinced that 
a more explicit acceptance of the Security Treaty by the 
JSP is necessary for a coalition with the centrist 
parties, it might apply further pressure on the JSP to 
change. If the party continues its long term decline, 
Sohyo might also pressure the JSP to adopt more 
"realistic" policies inclusive of defence. 
If the LDP were to perform badly at future 
national elections, it is conceivable that the JSP would 
expediently adopt a more "positive" outlook towards the 
I 
I 
-I 
Security Treaty if it had a real opportunity to form a 
coalition government with the centrist parties. 
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If the LDP were to lose its majority, an LDP-DSP 
coalition or even an LDP-DSP-Komeito coalition is more 
attractive to the centrist parties than a coalition with 
the JSP which still has a vocal Marxist component. An 
LDP-Centrist party coalition would destroy the hopes of 
the JSP of forming a coalition government. It would 
result in the loss of an important incentive for the JSP 
to change its defence policy. 
Yet, it is not impossible that the LDP would be 
split resulting in the formation of a coalition government 
comprising the JSP, Komeito, DSP and an LDP segment. 
Even if the JSP were to form the largest component in such 
a coalition, its hands would be tied by its coalition 
partners from abrogating the Security Treaty. 
It is conceivable that the JSP, entrusted with 
power and responsibility, would continue to retain the 
alliance given the political and economic costs Japan 
could possibly suffer if it leaves the alliance. Takuya 
Kubo believes that "should the JSP take over the reins of 
government administration, principle will remain 
principle, but more realistic security policies will 
2 
actually be adopted". 
Would the JSP change its defence policy if 
international conditions deteriorated? Even if the USSR 
2. Takuya Kubo, Ope cit., p.37. 
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were to continue its military buildup, the pro Soviet 
factions would oppose any moves to regard the USSR as a 
threat to Japan. If there is a conflict in the Korean 
peninsula or if either of the Koreas were to acquire 
nuclear weapons, it would result in factional disputes 
over the question of threat to Japan. Given the 
different factional outlook, turbulence in North East Asia 
could lead to a polarization of the JSP's defence policy 
rather than a consensus about the need to change its 
defence policy in response to a common threat perception. 
Any outbreak of regional conflict would heighten the fear 
within the JSP that Japan's alliance with the US would 
drag Japan into a war where US interests are involved. 
Given the strong belief within the party that 
the alliance is potentially dangerous to Japan, could 
armed neutrality be made both an operational and 
declaratory policy of the JSP? 
Armed neutrality as JSP's official defence policy 
One important factor that has led to the long 
term decline of the JSP is its image of being an 
lIunrealisticll and lIirresponsible ll party incapable of 
holding power. The policy of unarmed neutrality has 
often been criticised as the epitome of irresponsible 
idealism. An explicit adoption of armed neutrality for 
Japan while retaining the ultimate ideal of unarmed 
neutrality would help to make the JSP's defence policy 
more credible. 
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The JSP could point out that the final ideal of 
unarmed neutrality would not be abandoned. It would have 
to argue that armed neutrality for Japan is preferable to 
an entangling alliance with the US; that Japan could cope 
with possible US economic retaliation; that the present 
level of military spending is sufficient to act as a 
deterrent against any aggressors. 
Armed neutrality for Japan would not really be a 
maJor change to the JSP's defence policy. Since the 
Ishibashi Plan of 1966, armed neutrality has always been 
the implicit, operational policy of the JSP. The only 
change is to make it explicit both the declaratory and 
operational policy of the JSP. Such a position could be 
rationalised as the second stage of the JSP's defence 
policy upon leaving the alliance. The rhetoric of 
unarmed neutrality as the final stage of a long, 
indeterminable process could still be kept as before. 
By adopting armed neutrality explicitly as its 
defence policy, the JSP need not follow the tails of 
Komeito and DSP in shifting toward the LDP's position on 
defence. A failure to adopt armed neutrality openly, 
coupled with a greater toleration of the Security Treaty, 
would place the JSP in a crowded field already occupied by 
the centrist parties. The JSP would then be unable to 
present an alternate perspective on defence for Japan. 
By making its preference for armed neutrality explicit, 
the JSP would retain its distinctive policy; present 
itself as a credible party with a viable, alternate 
defence policy which is potentially appealing to the 
3 Japanese people. 
The problems of adopting armed neutrality as 
party policy 
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There is the risk that armed neutrality as the 
party's policy would ignite factionalism which could even 
result in the breakaway of the left. Squabbling over 
defence policy would reinforce the image of the JSP as an 
ineffectual, faction-ridden party. However, if the left 
were to split from the party, they would be even more 
isolated politically. The party could rebuild itself, 
despite what might possibly be just a temporary setback, 
minus the doct~inaire attitudes of the left. Such a 
choice could still be rewarding in the long run. 
To adopt armed neutrality as the JSP's defence 
policy, the party must win Sohyo's support. Sohyo's 
implicit, operational defence policy is also armed 
3. See John Welfield, "Some Diplomatic and Strategic 
Aspects Of Japan's Present And Future Foreign 
Policies", Research Paper No. 84, May 1981, 
Australia-Japan Research Centre, pp.56-57. See also 
Radha Sinha, Japan's Options for the 1980s (Croom 
Helm, London: 1982), pp.242-247. Both authors 
present persuasive arguments that armed neutrality is 
indeed a viable and preferable strategic option for 
Japan. One question which both authors did not 
address is: Does armed neutrality for Japan 
necessitate more defence spendings than it would need 
if it has remained within the alliance framework? 
The onus is on the JSP to present a persuasive case 
that armed neutrality for Japan does not necessitate 
a stronger defence posture for Japan. 
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neutrality for Japan. Thus, if Sohyo were to adopt the 
policy of armed neutrality explicitly, it would not be a 
drastic change from its previous policy. 
What would be the consequence for "coalition 
politics" if the JSP were to openly adopt the policy of 
"armed neutrality?" 
Historically, both Komeito and the DSP have 
preferred armed neutrality for Japan though they have come 
to accept the alliance. This shift toward the LDP's 
position has the advantage of presenting themselves as 
acceptable coalition partners to the LDP. 
The JSP could reassure the centrist parties that 
it would accept the alliance "for the time being" while 
keeping armed neutrality as the opt i on for the future. 
What is more important is the JSP's future electoral 
performance. If the JSP continues to diminish in 
numbers, it would be a less attractive partner in a 
coalition. On the other hand, if the JSP is able to 
increase its parliamentary numbers, it would be more 
attractive to the centrist parties which would prefer to 
keep their coalition options open. Both the DSP and 
Komeito have made compromises on defence before, and would 
do so again if it facilitated the attainment of power 
through a coalition. 
Would the JSP's open adoption of armed 
neutrality lead to the erosion of its inhibitive role on 
LDP defence policy? The LDP could argue that increased 
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defence spending within the ambit of the Security Treaty 
would still be less than that demanded by the JSP's policy 
of armed neutrality. Moreover the JSP's position of 
armed neutrality could be interpreted by its opponents as 
a recognition of the need for armaments and thus a shift 
by the JSP to the right. 
Hence, one argument which could be used by LDP 
"doves" against the "hawks" within their party would be 
weakened: namely, that to increase defence spending would 
be politically disruptive given the absolutist position of 
unarmed neutrality by the JSP. The LDP government could 
also lose an excuse to convince the US that the pacifist 
sentiments of the main oppos i tion party, being in tune 
with a large segment of Japanese public opinion, are 
against US attempts to pressure Japan to increase its 
defence posture. 
Regardless of whether the JSP adopts an explicit 
policy of unarmed or armed neutrality, the US would 
maintain its pressure on Japan to upgrade its defence 
posture. While the US welcomes a shift to the right on 
defence by the JSp,4 it does not consider the JSP to be 
really important given its record as a party in perennial 
opposition. Even if the JSP were to cling to its present 
4. See Asahi, August 5, 1984. The US pointed out that 
the JSP is changing its attitude towards the Security 
Treaty. This, the US argued, is one indication that 
the strengthening of Japan's defence power would be 
more feasible. 
declaratory policy of unarmed neutrality, it would be 
increasingly ineffective in checking the LDP unless it 
improved its electoral performance. 
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Hitherto elections have not been won or lost by 
changes in defence policy. However, if armed neutrality 
were adopted, and if other policy changes could also be 
made - including the JSP distancing itself from the 
socialist bloc so as to appear really neutral; discarding 
Marxist dogmas; lessening its dependence on the trade 
unlons; and building up its grassroot support - the 
cumulative effect might change the moribund image of the 
JSP. These are indeed formidable tasks. Yet, the 
failure of the JSP to adjust to a new milieu can only lead 
to the party's increasing isolation and ineffectiveness in 
checking the LDP on defence issues. The result would be 
a greater inability to affect the formulation of Japan's 
defence policy. 
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